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INTRODUCTION
It is a truism of U.S. federal trademark law that there can be no
trademark rights in gross. Unlike a patent or copyright owner,
under current federal law, a trademark holder cannot control all
uses of its mark.' The Lanham Act2 only protects a trademark
holder against unauthorized, subsequent use of the same or similar
mark that is likely to result in public confusion concerning: the
source of the goods or services in question, or the sponsorship,
affiliation or approval by the senior mark holder of such junior
use.3  By making likelihood of confusion the "touchstone" of a
federal trademark infringement action, Congress sought to further
the Lanham Act's primary purpose, which is to protect the public
from deceptive and misleading trademark practices, without foster-
ing unnecessary monopolization of language that would impede
free competition.4
The Lanham Act also has an often overlooked second purpose:
namely, to protect the trademark owner's investment of "energy,
time and money in presenting to the public the product" from the
misappropriation of its trademark "by pirates and cheats."5 Justice
1. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 24.03(4)(d) (3d ed. 1995). Furthermore, unlike a patent or copyright
holder, a trademark owner's property right in its trademark is defined and governed by
its use of the mark in commerce. It cannot sell the trademark to another party separate
from the business goodwill, which the mark represents. See Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v.
Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1193-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
2. The Lanham Act, which is the more common name for the Trademark Act of
1946, as amended, is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
3. See id. at § 1114 (marks registered with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office);
id. at § 1125 (unregistered marks); see also International Order of Job's Daughters v.
Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1980). The unauthorized subsequent use
of a trademark, whether registered or not, is often referred to as the "junior" use. See,
e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 740 (2d Cir. 1994).
4. See Int'l Order of Job's Daughters, 633 F.2d at 918-19; see also Bi-Rite Enters.,
555 F. Supp. at 1194-95. The Lanham Act's primary purpose is manifest in § 45, under
the heading "Intent of Act," which provides in pertinent part that the "intent of this
chapter is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by making actionable the
deceptive and misleading uses of marks in such commerce .... 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
5. This secondary purpose is set forth in the Statement of the United States Trade-
mark Association ("USTA"), which it submitted in support of S. 1883, the Senate version
of the 1988 Trademark Law Revision Act:
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Felix Frankfurter best articulated this purpose in a trademark in-
fringement action brought under the precursor to the Lanham Act:
The protection of trade-marks [sic] is the law's recognition
of the psychological function of symbols. If it is true that
we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase
goods by them. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut
which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what
he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark
exploits this human propensity by making every effort to
impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing
power of a congenial symbol. Whatever the means em-
ployed, the aim is the same-to convey through the mark,
in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the
commodity upon which it appears. Once this is attained,
the trade-mark owner has something of value. If another
poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he
6has created, the owner can obtain legal redress...
Trademark "dilution" is the legal theory that seeks to protect a
trademark owner directly against the diminution of a trademark's
"commercial magnetism" or selling power by unauthorized junior
use of the same or substantially similar mark.7 Approximately half
of the states have enacted statutes that seek to protect against trade-
mark dilution; and at least one state has adopted the dilution theory
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is two-fold. One is to protect
the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a partic-
ular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks
for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent
energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected
in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is a
well-established rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark own-
er.
Statement of the United States Trademark Assoc. In Support of S. 1883 (DeConcini) The
Trademark Law Revision Act, reprinted in 78 TRADEMARK REP. 382, 384-85 (1988)
[hereinafter USTA Statement] (quoting H.R. REP. No. 219, 79th Cong., 1st. Sess. 2-3
(1945)).
6. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205
(1942).
7. See, e.g., Beverly W. Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for
Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289, 290 (1985).
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as part of its common law.8 Under all relevant state law, the two
essential elements of a trademark dilution claim are the same: the
senior holder must possess a distinctive trademark, and there must
be a likelihood of dilution.9 Although important differences exist
among the states concerning the proper scope of dilution law, most
states that have adopted the dilution doctrine are currently in agree-
ment on two crucial points: trademark dilution can occur regardless
of the lack of a likelihood of confusion and despite the absence of
competition between the parties.'0
In the last decade or so, the role of dilution theory in U.S.
trademark law has dramatically increased in importance. Although
dilution theory is a creature of state law, in recent years the federal
8. The three major trademark jurisdictions, New York, Illinois, and California, have
each passed a dilution statute. These statutes are codified, respectively, at N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765, 1035/15 (1995); and
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987). The other states that have enacted
dilution statutes are: Alabama, at ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1993); Arkansas, at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-71-113 (Michie 1993); Connecticut, at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-1li(c) (1993);
Delaware, at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1993); Florida, at FLA. STAT. ch. 495.151
(1995); Georgia, at GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b) (1994); Idaho, at IDAHO CODE § 48-
512 (1977); Iowa, at IOWA CODE § 548.113 (1995); Louisiana, at LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 223.1 (West 1995); Maine, at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1994); Mas-
sachusetts, at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. lI0B, § 12 (West 1995); Missouri, at MO.
REV. STAT. § 417.061(1) (1995); Montana, at MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1994);
Nebraska, at NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-122 (1994); New Hampshire, at N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 350-A:12 (1994); New Mexico, at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-10 (Michie 1995);
Oregon, at OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 (1994); Pennsylvania, at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54,
§ 1124 (1995); Rhode Island, at R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-12 (1992); Tennessee, at TENN.
CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1995); Texas, at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (West
1995); and Washington, at WASH. REV. CODE § 19.77.160 (1995). See also McCarthy,
supra note 1, § 24.14(2). Ohio has adopted the dilution doctrine as part of its common
law. See Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th
Cir. 1987).
* 9. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d
1026, 1030 (2d Cir. 1989); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1987), aff'd in part,
855 F.2d 480, 482 (7th Cir. 1988); Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v.
Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991).
10. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1030; Ringling Bros., 855 F.2d at 484-
85; Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 830
F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1987).
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courts have taken the lead in defining the doctrine's parameters."
Several federal courts have decided the outcome of a trademark
case based on a state dilution claim which had been attached to a
federal trademark infringement action under the pendent jurisdic-
tion doctrine.12  In finding that dilution occurred despite the ab-
sence of federal trademark infringement, these federal courts have
indirectly expanded the scope of trademark protection available
under U.S. law.' 3
The increasing importance of dilution law to U.S. trademark
practice is evidenced by the fact that in 1988, the U.S. Senate
passed a federal trademark bill that, in part, sought to amend the
Lanham Act to include a limited dilution. provision.14  The U.S.
Trademark Association ("USTA") had been the chief sponsor of
this provision.' 5 Congress eventually deleted this provision from
the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 prior to its becoming
law.' 6 However, the USTA (now the International Trademark As-
sociation or "INTA") continued to strongly support a federal dilu-
tion statute in the ensuing years."
In March, 1995, Rep. Carlos Moorhead (R-Calif.) introduced
11. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1994)
(broadly construing New York's dilution statute to protect against more than the tradition-
al, judicially recognized categories of dilution by "blurring" or "tarnishment"); see also
infra part III (discussing categories of dilution law, and Deere's arguable expansion of the
dilution cause of action in New York).
12. See, e.g., American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved.Labs. Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 2006, 2012-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Ringling Bros. 855 F.2d at 482-84; McDonald's
Corp. v. Arche Technologies, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1557, 1559-60 (N.D. Cal. 1990); see
also discussion infra part III.
13. See, e.g., Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 44.
14. See The Trademark Law Revision Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (1988).
15. See USTA Statement, supra note 5, at 404-07. The USTA has since changed its
name to the International Trademark Association ("INTA"). This Article refers to the
1988 federal dilution bill as the USTA-proposed statute.
16. See Jerome Gilson, A Federal Dilution Statute: Is It Time?, 83 TRADEMARK REP.
108, 115 (1993).
17. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. H14317 (December 12, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Moorhead); 141 Cong. Rec. S19310 (December 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). In
addition to its federal lobbying efforts the USTA revised the Model State Trademark Bill
in 1992 to include its previously proposed federal dilution provision. See Gilson, supra
note 16, at 116.
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the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("FTDA") before the
U.S. House of Representatives. With one major, notable change,
the FTDA is largely modeled on the 1988 proposed federal dilution
statute.19 In December, 1995, Congress passed the FTDA, which
President Clinton signed into law on January 16, 1996.20
Thus, it has become imperative to assess the proper role that
dilution law should play in U.S. trademark law. In essence, dilu-
tion law attempts to provide a trademark owner with direct protec-
tion against the misappropriation of its mark's selling power.21
Because this attempt is fully congruent with the Lanham Act's
secondary purpose, it should not automatically be concluded that
dilution law conflicts with the goals of traditional federal trademark
law.22 However, because of the central, "misappropriation protec-
18. See 141 Cong. Rec. H3572 (March 22, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
19. See 49 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 646 (1995). The major
notable difference between the FIDA and the federal dilution provision proposed in 1988
is that the FTDA attempts to more adequately address First Amendment concerns voiced
by the broadcasting industry and other groups that had opposed the earlier federal dilution
proposal. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S19310 (December 29, 1995) (supporting statement
of Sen. Hatch); 141 Cong. Rec. S19312 (December 29, 1995) (supporting statement of
Sen. Leahy); see also infra parts III, IV.D.
20. Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (January 16, 1996), available in WESTLAW,
U.S. Bill Tracking 1995 US H.B. 1295; LEXIS 1995 Bill Tracking H.R. 1295.
21. See Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 44 (quoting with approval Shadow Box, Inc. v.
Drecq, 336 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) for the proposition that New York's
dilution statute potentially "protects ... against any use of the symbol that may drain off
any of the potency of the mark").
22. This Article does not suggest that the Lanham Act incorporates the state law
doctrine of misappropriation. This doctrine "is based on the law's reluctance to permit
unjust enrichment or to permit a person to 'reap where one has not sown."' Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 852, 858 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (quoting International News Servs. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)).
Unlike traditional federal trademark law, the state law doctrine of misappropriation does
not require proof of likelihood of confusion. Because of the easier evidentiary proof
allowed under the state misappropriation doctrine, some courts have been reluctant to
allow a separate misappropriation claim when a plaintiff cannot prevail on its trademark
infringement claim for fear of "wip[ing] out the law of trademarks." Sykes Lab., Inc. v.
Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 855-56 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (quoting J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10:34, at 430 (2d ed. 1984)). Other courts have allowed
a separate state misappropriation claim to stand when appended to a federal trademark
infringement action on the rationale that "one may not use the mark of another to obtain
a 'free ride' on his efforts to promote that mark." Universal City Studios, 207 U.S.P.Q.2d
[Vol. 6:105
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tion" goal of dilution law, there is a danger that federal adoption
of an overly broad dilution doctrine could elevate the Lanham
Act's secondary purpose to its primary one, thereby "swallow[ing]
up all competition in the claim of protection" against trademark
infringement.23 Since dilution law protects a senior holder against
unauthorized, non-confusing, junior uses of an identical or substan-
tially similar mark despite the absence of competition between the
parties, there is the danger that an overly broad dilution doctrine
could result in serious anti-competitive effects and First Amend-
ment violations.24
The purpose of this Article is to provide an assessment of the
proper role that dilution law should play in the U.S. trademark
practice. Part I discusses the origins of U.S. dilution law. Part II
provides an overview of the dilution doctrine as it has developed
in the case law, with emphasis given to the law of the Second,
Seventh and Ninth Circuits. This overview includes a discussion
of the major doctrinal similarities and differences in these circuits.
Part III addresses the recent Congressional efforts to amend the
Lanham Act to include a federal dilution provision. Part IV in-
cludes an evaluation of First Amendment and other concerns raised
by the dilution theory as well as a discussion of whether Congress
acted prudently when adopting a federal dilution amendment.
at 858.
This Article does suggest that, as revealed by the Lanham Act's legislative history,
the secondary purpose of federal trademark law is to perform a "misappropriation preven-
tion" function. This secondary purpose has allowed some courts to expand the scope of
Lanham Act protection even in the absence of explicit proof of a likelihood of confusion.
See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1981). Similarly,
one can view the dilution doctrine as dovetailing with this secondary purpose. However,
the danger of an overly broad dilution doctrine is that it could overwhelm and negate the
primary purpose of the Lanham Act, which is to protect against confusing uses of a
trademark. The challenge is to affix the proper scope of the dilution doctrine so as to
strike a balance between the Act's primary and secondary purposes.
23. Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting
Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 803 n.3 (9th Cir. 1970)).
24. For an excellent discussion of some of the First Amendment concerns posed by
an overly broad dilution doctrine, see Arlen W. Langvardt, Trademark Rights and First
Amendment Wrongs: Protecting the Former Without Committing the Latter, 83 TRADE-
MARK REP. 633, 653-57 (1993).
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This Article concludes that, although concerns posed by the
dilution doctrine. are very real, they are not insurmountable. The
challenge is to restrict the scope of the dilution doctrine, striking
a balance between the primary and secondary purposes of the
Lanham Act. Consequently, adoption of a limited federal dilution
provision, with appropriate safeguards to meet First Amendment
concerns, 25 is preferable to the alternative of allowing the state
dilution doctrine to expand on an unfettered course.
I. ORIGINS OF U.S. DILUTION LAW
Most commentators trace the origins of U.S. dilution law to a
law review article written in 1927 by Frank Schechter.26 In the
article, Schechter lamented the fact that, at the time the article was
written,' there was no trademark protection in this country against
unauthorized use of a holder's mark on non-competitive goods.27
Under the then governing 1905 Trademark Act, trademark infringe-
ment could occur only when the alleged infringer's use was on
goods of the "same descriptive properties" as the senior holder's
goods.28 Schechter viewed the narrow scope of the available feder-
al trademark protection as wholly inadequate to safeguard the real
value of a trademark, namely, its selling power.29 Although the
source-identifying function of a trademark is necessarily part of its
selling power Schechter argued that a trademark's primary value
lay in its "uniqueness or singularity," enabling the mark to function
as a distinctive symbol of a certain level of quality and reliability.3°
According to Schechter, the selling value of a mark constituted
an essential property right, capable of being injured by the mark's
unauthorized use on non-competing goods, regardless of whether
25. See infra part IV:
26. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 813 (1927);.see also Gilson, supra note 16, at 109; Milton W. Handler, Are the
State Antidilution Laws Compatible with the National Protection of Trademarks?, 75
TRADEMARK REP. 269, 270 (1985).,
27. Schechter, supra note 26, at 824-26.
28. Trademark Act of 1905 § 5(b).
29. Schechter, supra note 26, at 819, 824-25.
30. Id. at 831.
[Vol. 6:105
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such use would likely result in public confusion regarding the
source of the non-competing goods.31  He thought it was unfair
that, under, the prevailing U.S. trademark doctrine, most courts
would allow a junior user to adopt, for example, the mark "Kodak"
for bicycles merely because bicycles possessed descriptive proper-
ties different than film products.32 Schechter further believed that
a stronger mark required greater protection against its unauthorized
use on non-competing goods. In language that would be often
quoted by U.S. courts, Schechter explained:
The real injury in all such cases can only be gauged in the
light of what has been said concerning the function of a
trademark. It is the gradual whittling away or dispersion of
the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or
name by its use upon non-competing goods. The more
,distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress
upon the public consciousness, and the greater its need for
its protection against vitiation or dissociation from the par-
ticular product in connection with which it has been used.33
Thus, at least for already famous, "coined or unique" marks,
Schechter proposed expanding the scope of federal trademark pro-
tection to prohibit their unauthorized use on non-competing prod-
ucts. 34 Although he did not mention the term "dilution" in his
article, one of the non-American cases he cited in support of such
expansion used the word "diluted" when describing the injury that
likely would result from the unauthorized use of a well-established
mark on a non-competing good. Schechter's dilution theory did
31. Id. at 825.
32. Id. at 825-26. In 1898, a British court had granted the U.S. film manufacturer,
Kodak, protection against the unauthorized use of its mark on bicycles manufactured by
a British company. Eastman Kodak v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 RPC 105 (1898). The
British court had perfunctorily determined that there was a likelihood of confusion regard-
ing source despite the paucity of evidence on this point. Id.; see also Pattishall, supra
note 7, at 289 n.4. Schechter approved of the decision but sought firmer ground to shore
up the result for adoption in this country. Schechter, supra note 26, at 825.
33. Schechter, supra note 26, at 825.
34. Id. at 832.
35. Id. at 831-32 (citing the "German Odol" case, Landgericht Elberfeld, 25
Juristische Wochenschrift 502 (1924), which prevented a well-known German manufactur-
1995]
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not receive formal attention for several decades. However, one
year after Schechter published his law ,review article, when ruling
in a federal trademark infringement action, Judge Learned Hand
echoed Schechter's concerns:
The law of unfair trade comes down very nearly to
this-as judges have repeated again and again-that one
merchant shall not divert customers from another by repre-
senting what he sells as emanating from the second. This
has been, and perhaps even more now is, the whole Law
and the Prophets on the subject, though it assumes many
guises. Therefore it was at first a debatable point whether
a merchant's good will, indicated by his mark, could extend
beyond such goods as he sold. How could he lose bargains
which he had no means to fill? What harm did it do a
chewing gum maker to have an ironmonger use his trade-
mark? The law often ignores the nicer sensibilities.
However, it has of recent years been recognized that a
merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in the use
of his mark outside the field of his own exploitation to jus-
tify interposition by a court. His mark is his authentic seal;
by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his
name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the
owner's reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his
own control. This is an injury, even though the borrower
does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a repu-
tation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and cre-
ator, and another can use it only as a mask. And so it has
come to be recognized that, unless the borrower's use is so
foreign to the owner's as to insure against any identification
of the two, it is unlawful.36
Yale Electric Corporation v. Robertson3' addressed the question
of whether a locksmith manufacturer could prevent the use of its
federally registered mark ("Yale") by an unrelated manufacturer of
er's mark for mouthwash from being used on various steel products).
36. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1928).
37. 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
[Vol. 6:105
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electric flashlight torches and batteries.3 8  In deciding in the affir-
mative, Judge Hand presaged the elimination of the "same descrip-
tive properties" rule in the 1946 Lanham Act. In addition, his
decision seminally influenced the development of the "related
goods". doctrine, which expanded the scope of federal trademark
protection to encompass protection against unauthorized, confusing
uses of a holder's mark on non-competitive goods. 39 The Second
Circuit was the first to codify the "related goods" doctrine in its
famous Polaroid decision in 1961, which set forth an eight factor
test for determining when the unauthorized junior use of a mark on
non-competitive goods resulted in a likelihood of confusion. 40
Over the next couple of decades, the other circuits would adopt
similar tests.4 '
Concurrent with the development of the "related goods" doc-
trine, and largely for the same reason, the dilution doctrine took
root in the states. In 1947, Massachusetts became the first state
to adopt a dilution statute.42 Illinois and New York quickly fol-
38. id. at 973-74.
39. For an excellent discussion summarizing the history of the "related goods"
doctrine, see MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24.01-.03.
40. These factors include: the strength of the senior holder's mark; the degree of
similarity between the two marks; the proximity of the products; the likelihood that the
prior owner will bridge the gap; the existence of actual confusion; the defendant's lack
of good faith in adopting the same or similar mark; the quality of the defendant's product;
and the purchasers' sophistication. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d
492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
41. See, e.g., Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1989); Pizze-
ria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522 (4th Cir. 1984); Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743
F.2d 1508 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934 (10th
Cir. 1983); Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, Inc., 670 F.2d 642 (6th Cir.
1982); SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1980); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft
Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589
F.2d 1225 (3d Cir. 1978); Helene Curtis Indus. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325
(7th Cir. 1977); Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1975); see also MC-
CARTHY, supra note 1, § 24.06(4)(a) (summarizing the development of the "related
goods" doctrine).
42. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110B, § 12 (West 1995); see also Gilson, supra note
16, at 109. Although most states call their statutes "anti-dilution" measures, Gilson'sug-
gests dropping the "anti" since trademark infringement statutes are not referred to as
"anti-infringement" measures. See id. I have adopted his suggestion throughout this
Article.
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lowed suit.43 The purpose underlying these state dilution statutes
is the same: to prevent, in Schechter's words, "the whittling away
of an established trade-mark's selling power and value through its
unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar products." 44 In 1964,
the USTA adopted a dilution provision as part of its Model State
Trademark Bill, which stated:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of
the distinctive quality of a mark registered under this Act,
or a mark valid at common law, or a trade name valid at
common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief not-
withstanding the absence of competition between the parties
or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or
41services.
Over the next few decades, most of the states that adopted dilution
statutes modeled their statutes on the USTA provision. 6 Without
much legislative history to guide them, it was left to the courts to
interpret and develop the dilution doctrine.
43. The original Illinois statute became effective on January 1, 1956 (currently codi-
fied at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765 § 1035/15 (1993)). The original New York statute
became effective on September 1, 1961 (currently codified at N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §
368-d (McKinney 1984)).
44. 1954 N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 49, quoted in Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1028; see
also Ringling Bros., 855 F.2d at 482.
45. Model State Trademark Act, § 12, reprinted in MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §
24.14(2); see also Gilson, supra note 16, at 109-10.
46. See ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1993); ARK. STAT. § 4-71-113 (1993); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-11i(c) (1993); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1993); FLA. STAT. § 495.151 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451(b)
(1994); IDAHO CODE § 48-512(1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765, § 1035/15 (1995); IOWA
CODE § 548.113 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 223.1 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. IOB, § 12 (West 1995);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 417.061(1) (1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1994); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 87-122 (1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
57-3-10 (Michie 1995); N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 368-d (McKinney 1984); OR. REV. STAT. §
647.107 (1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, § 1124 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-12 (1992);
and TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1995); TEx. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29




IH. THE DILUTION CASE LAW
As developed by the courts, the dilution doctrine embraces
several distinct theories of harm to a trademark. The two primary
theories are "dilution by blurring" and "dilution by tamishment." 47
These dilution theories were the first to be propounded by the
courts,48 and most dilution cases have asserted at least one of these
theories. 49  A third, less well known theory is "dilution by
genericization." 50 A fourth, arguably distinct dilution theory was
just recently articulated by the Second Circuit in Deere & Co. v.
MTD Products, Inc.51 Although this theory remains unnamed, it
might aptly be termed "dilution by humorous alteration of a com-
petitor's mark. ' 52  An examination of each of these theories is
necessary for a full understanding and assessment of the dilution
doctrine.
A. Dilution By Blurring
"Dilution by blurring" has been described as the "classic" or
"traditional" strand of the dilution doctrine.53 As'one commentator,
and strong proponent of the dilution theory, has explained:
[t]he gravamen of a dilution complaint is that the continu-
ous use of a mark similar to plaintiff's works an inexorably
adverse effect upon the distinctiveness of the plaintiff's
mark, and that, if he is powerless to prevent such use, his
mark will lose its distinctiveness entirely. This injury dif-
fers materially from that arising out of the orthodox confu-
47. See Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1031 (defining dilution "as either the blurring
of a mark's product identification or the tarnishment of the affirmative associations a
mark has come to convey").
48. See Polaroid, 319 F.2d at 836-837 (recognizing "dilution by blurring" as a valid
legal theory); Tiffany & Co. v. The Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 843-44 (D.
Mass. 1964) (positing "dilution by tarnishment" as a grounds for recovery distinct from,
and in addition to, "dilution by blurring").
49. See, e.g., Tiffany & Co., 231 F. Supp. at 844; see also MCCARTHY, supra note
1, § 24.13(1)(a).
50. See, e.g., Sykes Lab., Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 857 (C.D. Cal. 1985)
(holding that a plaintiff may maintain a dilution action under California law on the theory
that the defendant's identification of its product as a version of the plaintiff's product may
render the plaintiffs mark a generic term).
51. 41 F.3d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1994).
52. Id. at 45.
53. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24.13(1)(a)(i); see also Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 42-
43 (recognizing "dilution by blurring" as one of the traditional forms of dilution).
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sion. Such confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilu-
tion is an infection which, if allowed to spread, will inevita-
bly destroy the advertising value of the mark.54
Another advocate of the dilution doctrine has defined the injury
caused by blurring as distinct from confusion since it "occurs when
an awareness that a particular mark signifies 'a single thing coming
from a single source' becomes instead an unmistaken, correct
awareness that the mark signifies various things from various
sources." 5  Still yet another :-ommentator, who favors a limited
dilution doctrine, has explained that a use that is confusing to some
purchasers can also be non-confusing but diluting to others.56 Even
for the non-confused purchaser, seeing an identical or substantially
similar mark on a non-competitive good triggers a mental associa-
tion of the senior holder's mark. If the purchaser knows that due
to the high degree of differences between the goods, it is unlikely
that the senior mark holder produced or sponsored the goods in
question, then confusion will not result. However, if such junior
uses of similar marks on unrelated goods multiply, then blurring of
the mark will eventually result, since seeing the mark will no lon-
ger remind the purchaser of the unique associations that the senior
mark holder has laboriously sought to create.57
This first dilution theory captures the concern enunciated by
Schechter that "if you allow Rolls Royce restaurants, and Rolls
Royce cafeterias, and Rolls Royce pants, and Rolls Royce candy,
in ten years you will not have the Rolls Royce mark any more."58
54. RUDOLF CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS §
21.11, at 66-67 (4th ed. 1994) (footnote omitted).
55. Pattishall, supra note 7, at 300 (footnote omitted). Pattishall's major contribution
to the development of the dilution doctrine is her characterization of dilution as a tort
sounding in trespass, rather than deceit, as is the case with federal and state trademark
infringement law. See id. at 309. Pattishall also popularized the notion of dilution theory
protecting against the diminution of a mark's "commercial magnetism," a phrase which
she borrowed from Justice Frankfurter's Mishawaka decision. See id. at 290 n.10
(Mishawaka Rubber & Wollen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresege Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)).
56. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24.13(1)(b).
57. id.
58. Hearings Before the House Comm. on Patents, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1932)
(statement of Frank Schecter), quoted in David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark
Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531, 539 (1991).
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In today's age of consumer electronics, one could update
Schechter's example and ponder the effect that the unauthorized
use of the name Sony would have on the original mark holder if
there were allowed to exist Sony deodorant, Sony drain clog re-
mover, Sony candy bars, or Sony soda. Even if the purchaser
knew that the electronics manufacturer had neither produced nor
sponsored the goods in question, in time it is likely that such repet-
itive use for diverse, unrelated products would have a diluting ef-
fect on the Sony mark. With such widespread, divergent use, one
would no longer think exclusively or primarily of the state of the
art, high technology, associations of excellence, and superior crafts-
manship currently reflected in its name.
The Seventh Circuit was one of the first to address the "dilution
by blurring" theory. In Polaroid Corporation v. Polaraid, Inc., 
59
the photographic equipment manufacturer sought to prevent the use
of the mark "Polaraid" on refrigeration and heating systems.60
Although Polaroid's first claim was for federal trademark infringe-
ment, the court refused to decide that issue because it believed that
Polaroid had stated a better case under either its second claim for
state misappropriation of its mark, or under its third claim for state
dilution.6' In deciding the misappropriation claim for the plaintiff,
the court relied on Judge Hand's decision in the Yale lock case.62
The court found that the defendant had known of the Polaroid
name when it adopted its substantially similar mark and dismissed
the defendant's argument that its mark was not an appropriation of
the plaintiff's name, but rather a combination of the words "polar"
and "aid," which described its services.63 The court admonished
the defendant for coming "as near as possible to selecting plain-
tiff's trademark" despite "all the names which were available,"
without even considering the possibility of confusion. 64
59. 319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963).
60. Id. at 831-32.
61. Id. at 833.
62. See id. at 835 (citing Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.
1928)).
63. See id. at 835-36.
64. id. at 835.
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Although much of the court's discussion of the second claim is
couched in the language of misappropriation, which does not re-
quire a finding of confusion, the court nevertheless concluded that
the junior use was likely to produce confusion.65 This finding is
significant because it illustrates the reluctance of courts, during the
fledgling period of the "related goods" and dilution doctrines, to
find the misappropriation of a mark without also finding a likeli-
hood of confusion. Nevertheless, the court held that, even in the
absence of such a finding, the Illinois dilution statute prevented the
unauthorized junior use of the plaintiff's strong mark, "which
through much effort and the expenditure of large amounts of mon-
ey had acquired a widespread reputation and much good will,
which plaintiff should not be required to share with defendant. 66
In language since quoted by other courts, the Seventh Circuit stated
that "by its plain, unambiguous language [the Illinois dilution stat-
ute] lays a.heavy hand upon one who. adopts the trade name or
mark of another. 67., The Court further noted that "[i]f the Anti-
dilution Statute is not applicable to this situation, it is useless be-
cause it adds nothing to the established law on unfair competition
9,68
Another influential case in the development of the "dilution by
blurring" doctrine was Tiffany & Co. v. the Boston Club, Inc.69 In
Tiffany, the New York jeweler sought to prevent the use of the
name "Tiffany" on a restaurant and bar in downtown Boston.7 °
When the restaurant first opened, it offered as part of a promotion,
free tickets to the movie, "Breakfast at Tiffany's," which was then
playing.71 Although the court found that the defendant's use of the
famous name was likely to confuse its patrons concerning the spon-
sorship or affiliation with the New York jeweler,72 the case is re-
65. Id. at 835-36.
66. id. at 837.
67. . id. at 836.
68. Id. at 837.
69. 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964). This case is important for developing not
only the "dilution by blurring" doctrine, but also the "dilution by tarnishment" theory.
70. See id. at 838, 842-43.
71. Id. at 841-42.
72. See id. at 842.
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markable for its extensive discussion of the dilution claim despite
a paucity of precedent in the dilution area. This case is also impor-
tant because, while Schechter had confined his dilution theory to
coined, invented or other unique marks, the court extended dilution
protection to any mark "of distinctive quality," including marks that
had become valid after obtaining secondary meaning.73 The court
found that because the "Tiffany" mark was "very strong" and well
known to the public as "a synonym of quality to a very high de-
gree," 74 there was a likelihood that the defendant's unauthorized
use of the same mark would diminish the "distinctiveness, unique-
ness, effectiveness, and prestigious connotations" associated with
the senior holder's mark. 75 As in Polaroid, the court cited Yale for
the proposition that the defendant could not "subject the good will
and reputation of the plaintiff's name and trademark to the hazards
of the defendant's business. 76
Despite the clear wording of the .Model State dilution statute
that states a dilution cause of action could exist "notwithstanding
the ... absence of confusion as to the source of goods or servic-
es, many courts in the 1960s and 1970s were reluctant to find a
valid dilution claim without first finding a likelihood of confu-
sion.78  As one court explained, "[wle have regarded the
antidilution doctrine with some concern 'lest it swallow up all
competition in the claim of protection against trade name infringe-
ment.' ' 79 In fact, courts continue to find a state dilution, violation
in more cases where there has been a traditional trademark in-
fringement violation predicated upon proof of a likelihood of con-
fusion than in cases without a finding of a likelihood of confu-
73. id. at 843.
74. Id. at 842-43.
75. Id. at 844.
76. Id. at 843 (citing Yale Elec. Corp., 26 F.2d at 974).
77. Model State Trademark Act § 12, reprinted in MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §
24.14(2).
78. See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Chandris
Am. Lines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 707, 712-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Girl Scouts of the U.S.A. v.
Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1233-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
79. Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting
Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 803 n.3 (9th Cir. 1970)).
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sion.
However, in Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical
Trades, Inc.,s8 the New York Court of Appeals definitively held
that the New York dilution statute meant what it said: a plaintiff
could raise a successful dilution claim despite the absence of a
likelihood of confusion. 2 In language that would be quoted often
by courts in the Second Circuit, as well as others, the court stated
that "[t]he evil which the Legislature sought to remedy was not
public confusion caused by similar products or services sold by
competitors, but a cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or
services which feeds upon the business reputation of an established
distinctive trade-mark or name. 8 3  The court then established,
without elaboration, that the two primary elements of a dilution
cause of action were: (1) a strong mark; and (2) a showing of a
likelihood of dilution.84 Other New York federal courts would add
80. See, e.g., Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Creative House
Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1456-57 (9th Cir. 1991) (precluding use of Academy's
"Oscar" design by unrelated corporation for statue given out and sold as awards for
corporate excellence on traditional trademark and dilution grounds); McDonald's Corp.
v. McBagel's, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1279-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (prohibiting use of
plaintiff's "Mc" family mark on bagel shop on grounds of both likelihood of confusion
and dilution); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1201,
1206-08 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (barring use of "Kids r Us" mark for children's clothing store
on traditional trademark infringement and dilution grounds); Dreyfus Fund Inc. v. Royal
Bank of Canada, 525 F. Supp. 1108, 1122-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (preventing use of the
plaintiff's "lion," which was well known in the financial services area, by a bank on the
grounds of both likelihood of confusion and dilution); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 852, 857-59 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (prohibiting
the use of the mark "Jaws" on garbage disposals based on traditional trademark infringe-
ment, state misappropriation, and state dilution doctrines); see also Nikon Inc. v. Ikon
Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 95-96 (2nd Cir. 1993); Stem's Miracle-Gro Prods., Inc. v. Shark
Prods., 823 F. Supp. 1077, 1090-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Allied
Old English, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 123, 133-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
81. 399 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1977).
82. Id. at 631-32.
83. Id. at 632; Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 1983)
(quoting Allied Maintenance Corp., 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632).
84. Allied Maintenance Corp., 399 N.Y.S.2d at 632. Because the Court found that
the mark, "Allied Maintenance," was not sufficiently strong to warrant protection under
the dilution statute, it stopped short of elaborating on the showing necessary to establish
a likelihood of dilution. Id. at 632-33.
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a third element, predatory intent, as either a relevant or necessary
factor.85
Having firmly established that the absence of a likelihood of
confusion did not bar a dilution claim, an increasing number of
courts in the 1980s began to consider a dilution claim as raising the
dispositive issue in suits with both a traditional trademark infringe-
ment claim and a dilution claim. 86 For example, in Instrumentalist
Co. v. Marine Corps League,8 7 the publisher of a music magazine,
designed for high school band and orchestra directors, brought a
federal trademark and state dilution cause of action against a non-
profit organization that, together with the U.S. Marine Corps, spon-
sored various youth activities, including a national high school
band contest.88 The plaintiff possessed a registered trademark in
the name, "John Philip Sousa," together with a picture of his like-
ness, for use on plaques and other awards, distributed each year to
the most outstanding band member of each participating high
school. 89  The defendant also utilized the name and likeness of
John Philip Sousa on an award it issued to the winner of its nation-
al high school band contest.9° Although the court found that the
plaintiff had failed to sustain its burden of proof on the federal
trademark infringement claim, the court nonetheless granted injunc-
tive relief on the dilution claim.91 In so holding, the court relied
primarily on the plaintiff's proffered expert testimony that such
85. See, e.g., Sally Gee, Inc., 699 F.2d at 626 (predatory intent, or the lack thereof,
is a relevant factor). There is some disagreement in the Second Circuit as to the predato-
ry intent factor. While most courts have held that it is only a relevant factor, other
decisions suggest that it is necessary. Compare Stern's Miracle-Gro Prods. v. Shark
Prods., 823 F. Supp. 1077, 1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (predatory intent only a relevant factor)
with W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 576-77 (2d Cir. 1993)
(indicating, without elaboration, that predatory intent was a necessary element). Noting
this confusion, more recently the Second Circuit decided "to proceed cautiously" and
refused to hold that predatory intent was a necessary element in every New York dilution
action. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 46 (2d Cir. 1994).
86. See, e.g., Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps League, 509 F. Supp. 323, 332-33
(N.D. I11. 1981); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (7th Cir.
1984).
87. 509 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
88. id. at 325-26.
89. id. at 325-26.
90. Id. at 326.
91. Id. at 331, 335.
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unauthorized use would "water down" the prominence and signifi-
cance of the plaintiff's award.92
Similarly, in Ringling Bros. -Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,
Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 93 the plaintiff circus compa-
ny brought a federal trademark infringement and state dilution
cause of action against an Illinois car dealership, alleging the de-
fendant had infringed and diluted the plaintiff's registered trade-
mark in the slogan, "the Greatest Show on Earth," by advertising
its used car enterprise as "the Greatest Used Car Show on Earth."94
A federal magistrate recommended granting the plaintiff injunctive
relief on both grounds. In reviewing the magistrate's decision,
the district court could have affirmed on the basis of the federal
trademark claim given the ample evidence of a likelihood of confu-
sion.96 The defendant's slogan was substantially similar, and de-
ceptively presented "in a manner designed to evoke the circus,
using big, bold, red circus-style lettering. There was also evi-
dence that the plaintiff regularly entered into joint promotions with
local retailers, including an automobile dealership in Chicago, in
which it licensed the limited use of its slogan, "the Greatest Show
on Earth. 98 However, the district court chose to focus solely on
the state dilution count when granting the requested injunctive
relief.99
In affirming the lower court's decision on the dilution claim,
the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff's slogan was indeed a
strong, distinctive mark based on a number of factors: the length
92. Id. at 332-33. The outcome of this lawsuit greatly surprised the defendant's chief
counsel, Jerome Gilson, the noted trademark practitioner and treatise writer. Although,
at the time, Gilson opposed recognizing a federal dilution cause of action, he has since
changed his view and is now one of the leading advocates for adoption of USTA's 1988
proposed federal dilution amendment. See Gilson, supra note 16, at 111.
93. 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1300 (N.D. I11. 1987), aff'd in part, 855 F.2d 480, 481 (7th
Cir. 1988).
94. 855 F.2d at 481; see also 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1302.
95. 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1302-1303.
96. Id. at 1303.
97. 855 F.2d at 482; see also 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1302.
98. 855 F.2d at 481; see also 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1301-02.
99. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettleson
Chevrolet, Inc., No. 87-C4741, 1987 WL 17127 (N.D. I11. 1987).
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of time that the mark had been used (over 100 years); the nature
and extent of the plaintiffs business and reputation (nationwide);
and the scope of advertising and promotions ($10 million annually
for advertising and $50 million annually from promotional services
rendered under the mark).'0 ° Thus, the Seventh Circuit followed
the trend of granting dilution protection to strong marks, despite the
fact that they are not coined. The court further found that there
was a likelihood of dilution by blurring since the defendant's use,
if left unchecked, would create dissonance in the mind of a poten-
tial customer:
The mental image would be blurred, at least-to anyone who
had dealt with the other products or seen their advertising.
'It is the same dissonance that would be produced by sell-
ing cat food under the name "Romanoff" or baby carriages
under the name "Aston Martin"....' This dissonance con-
stitutes irreparable harm that cannot be measured and can
only be prevented through an injunction.10
The Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that
granting relief under the dilution statute would result in the monop-
olization of language. The court noted that it might have ruled
differently had the defendant changed its slogan slightly, for in-
stance, to "the Greatest Used Car Showroom On Earth," and not
used its circus-evoking presentation. 02
Ringling Bros. is also interesting because the court suggested
it would have recognized a fair use defense in the context of a
dilution claim; the court, however, ruled that the defendant lacked
such a defense.10 3 The defendant was in the automobile business,
not the entertainment business, so the use of the term "show" was
not a merely descriptive use. Furthermore, the successful raising
of a fair use defense required good faith, and the court explicitly
found that the defendant had not engaged in good faith when it
100. Ringling Bros., 855 F.2d at 483.
101. Id. at 485 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 482-83.
103. See id. at 483.
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adopted its mark.' ° Since lack of good faith suggests the defen-
dant intended to profit from its association with the senior holder's
mark, the Seventh Circuit would probably agree with the Second
Circuit that predatory intent is at least a relevant factor when deter-
mining the existence of a likelihood of dilution.l°5
The Seventh Circuit again addressed the "dilution by blurring"
issue in Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Services.1°6 In Hyatt, the Sev-
enth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the defen-
dant's use of the name, "Hyatt," for a legal services firm that ca-
tered primarily to indigent clientele did not infringe the plaintiff's
identical trademark, which was federally registered for its hotel
chain.' °7 In so doing, the Seventh Circuit accepted the district
court's finding that there was no likelihood of confusion, based
largely on the differences in the parties' respective services and
customers. l08 However, it reversed the district court's denial of
relief on the state dilution count."°
As in Ringling Bros., the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument
that only coined or invented words merited protection under the
dilution statute."0  The court found that, although Hyatt was a
personal name, it had become distinctive because of the plaintiff's
use of the mark for over 25 years, and its use in the plaintiff's
extensive advertising campaign and nationwide business."' There-
fore, the mark was worthy of protection under the dilution stat-
ute. 112
The court further found that there was a likelihood of dilution
by blurring for three reasons: first, because the defendant's mark
was identical; second, the defendant had expended millions of dol-
lars in advertising its name in the past few years; and third, the
104. Id. at 484.
105. See Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1037.
106. 736 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1984).
107. Id. at 1156-57.
108. Id. at 1156-57.
109. Id. at 1158-60.
110. Id. at 1158.
111. Id. at 1156.
112. Id. at 1158.
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defendant planned to expand its business to a nationwide enter-
prise. 13 The Seventh Circuit therefore concluded that the defen-
dant's use of its identical mark on a nationwide scale would "gnaw
away insidiously at the value" of the plaintiff's mark.' 14 Moreover,
the court found that this "injury would be remarkably difficult to
convert into damages" because "[t]here is no effective way to mea-
sure the loss of sales or potential growth-to ascertain the people
who don't knock on the door or to identify the specific persons
who do not [return] because of the existence of the infringer." '
Accordingly, injunctive relief under the dilution statute was appro-
priate.
The Seventh Circuit, once again, suggested that a defendant
may assert a potential fair use defense in the context of a dilution
claim. It noted that the defendant could have lawfully used the full
personal name of one of its partners, "Joel Hyatt," as its trade
name. 16 In fact, when granting injunctive relief, the Seventh Cir-
cuit noted that the defendant would be allowed to adopt the name,
"Joel Hyatt Legal Services," or some other distinguishing variation
without violating the state dilution statute. 1 7
While Ringling Bros. and Hyatt helped to develop the "dilution
by blurring" doctrine, greater refinement of the doctrine occurred
in the Second Circuit's decision in Mead Data Central, Inc. v.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.'18 In this case the plaintiff, a
computerized legal research services firm, sought injunctive relief
to prevent the defendant automobile company from using the term
"LEXUS" for its new luxury automobile line. 9 The plaintiff al-
leged that such use would both infringe and dilute its mark
"LEXIS" for its computerized legal research services. 20 The dis-
trict court denied the plaintiff's federal trademark claim but granted
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1158-59 (quoting Instrumentalist Co., 509 F. Supp. at 323).
116. See id. at 1159.
117. Id.
118. 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989), rev'g, 702 F. Supp. 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
119. Id. at 1027.
120. Id.
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injunctive relief on the dilution count. 121 The Second Circuit re-
versed the lower court's finding on the dilution claim without ad-
dressing the trademark infringement issue. 22
The Second Circuit's decision in Mead is significant for a num-
ber of reasons. First, it clarified the level of distinctiveness re-
quired to trigger dilution protection. According to the majority
opinion, it is not enough that a mark be strong and distinctive.
Rather, the mark must also be famous before it can claim the bene-
fit of dilution protection. 123  Furthermore, the majority opinion
strongly suggested that in order to qualify as a famous mark, the
mark must be well-known to the public generally and on a nation-
wide scale:
[T]he fact that a mark has selling power in a limited geo-
graphical or commercial area does not endow it with a sec-
ondary meaning for the public generally .... The strength
and distinctiveness of LEXIS is limited to the market for its
services-attorneys and accountants. Outside that market,
LEXIS has very little selling power. Because only one
percent of the general population associates LEXIS with the
attributes of Mead's service, it cannot be said that LEXIS
identifies that service to the general public and distinguishes
it from others .... 124
Thus, the majority opinion took a narrow view of the dilution doc-
trine, in accordance with Schechter's original intention that the
theory protect only famous marks such as Kodak, Rolls Royce, and
Buick. 21
Second, the majority opinion clarified that the dilution doctrine
protects a plaintiff from unauthorized uses of marks that are identi-
cal or substantially similar to its own.126 However, the court then
121. Mead Data Cent., 702 F. Supp. at 1039-40, 1044-45.
122. Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1027, 1032.
123. Id. at 1030-31.
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. See Schechter, supra note 26, at 829-30; see also Handler, supra note 26, at
274-76.
126. Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1028-29.
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rigorously applied the "substantial similarity" requirement and
found that the term "Lexus" was not substantially similar to the
term "Lexis" because they were pronounced differently. 27 In so
holding, the majority opinion appeared to adopt a copyright-like
analysis, which affords some degree of leeway to the copyist. 28
Third, the majority opinion clarified that although the dilution
doctrine does not require the unauthorized junior use to result in
confusion in the mind of the consuming public, the doctrine does
require the use to trigger at least some mental association with the
senior mark. 129 When determining whether a junior use is likely to
result in dilution, it is imperative to compare the scope of the de-
fendant's market to that of the plaintiff's. 130 If, as in this case, the
plaintiff s market is extremely limited in scope either commercially
or geographically, so that a significant percentage of the defen-
dant's consuming public does not even know of the plaintiffs
product, there can be no requisite mental association triggered by
the defendant's use and, thus, blurring cannot occur. 13' Because
this requisite association is more likely to occur with famous
marks, the majority opinion restricted the dilution doctrine to the
protection of only famous marks. 13
2
Fourth, the court found that when determining whether a likeli-
hood of dilution exists, the sophistication of prospective purchasers
is a relevant factor. 133  In Mead, the plaintiff's market consisted
primarily of lawyers and accountants, who were relatively sophisti-
127. Id. at 1029-30.
128. See, e.g., Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 900-01 (9th Cir. 1987);
Berkic v. Chrichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1985). In order to prevail in a
federal copyright case, a plaintiff must prove that there is "substantial similarity" between
his own protected creation and the defendant's work. Berkic, 761 F.2d at 1291. Because
only the particular, concrete expressions of ideas, and not the ideas themselves, are
protectable under federal copyright law, the common law tests devised for determining
"substantial similarity" grant a certain amount of leeway to an accused copyist. See
Aliotti, 831 F.2d at 901.
129. Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1031.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. Id. at 1031.
133. Id. at 1031-32.
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cated professionals. Thus, the court found there was little likeli-
hood that blurring would occur, even within the plaintiff's limited
market. 3
4
Judge Sweet's concurring opinion in Mead Data Central, Inc.
is important in its own right, for two reasons. First, unlike the
majority opinion, Judge Sweet found that an extremely strong,
distinctive mark that was famous in a limited geographic or product
market was just as worthy of protection under the dilution statute
as was a nationally famous mark. 135 On this point, there are more
cases that agree with Judge Sweet than with the majority opinion. 136
Second, echoing Polaroid, Judge Sweet outlined the relevant
factors that a court should consider when determining whether
likelihood of dilution by blurring exists in any given case. 137 These
factors include: (1) the similarity of the marks; (2) the similarity of
the products covered by the marks; (3) the sophistication of con-
sumers; (4) predatory intent; (5) renown of the senior mark; and (6)
renown of the junior mark. 38 Applying the factors to the case at
bar, Judge Sweet concluded that he concurred in the finding of no
likelihood of blurring, but he disagreed with the majority opinion
concerning whether the threshold level of distinctiveness existed.
According to Sweet, the "differences in the marks and in the prod-
ucts covered by the marks, the sophistication of Mead's consumers,
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1032-33.
136. See, e.g., Kraft Gen'l Foods, Inc. v. Allied Old English, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 123,
134 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (misreading Mead Data Cent. as holding that "distinctiveness for
dilution purposes often has been equated with the strength of a mark for infringement
purposes"); Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th
Cir. 1987) (stating that "[p]laintiff's trademark need not be nationally famous, however,
for a mark that is strong in a particular geographical or product area also deserves protec-
tion"); Dreyfus Fund, 525 F. Supp. at 1125 (stating that "[t]he statute should not be read
to deprive marks from protection against dilution in limited areas of use, since otherwise
it would afford protection only to the most notorious of all marks"); Wedgewood Homes,
Inc. v. Lund, 659 P.2d 377, 381 (Or. 1982) (rejecting "defendant's suggestion that the
statute be limited to nationally famous marks" since "[a] small local firm may expend
efforts and money proportionately as great as those of a large firm in order to establish
its mark's distinctive quality").
137. See Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1035-40.
138. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing Polaroid factors).
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the absence of predatory intent, and the limited renown of the
LEXIS mark all indicate that blurring is unlikely"' 3 9
One final, noteworthy case in the "dilution by blurring" area is
McDonald's Corp. v. Arche Technologies.140 In McDonald's Corp.,
the district court for the Northern District of California held that
although the defendant computer manufacturer's use of its single
"golden arch" design on its personal computers did not infringe the
plaintiff fast-food restaurant company's "golden arch" logo, such
use did violate the state dilution statute.1 4 1 This case demonstrates
the extent to which the dilution doctrine has become accepted by
the judiciary. In the Ninth Circuit, not only word marks, but de-
signs and colors are capable of being diluted.1 42 As evidenced by
McDonald's Corp., the "dilution by blurring" theory has indeed
come a long way since Schechter first proposed it for famous word
marks in 1927.143
B. Dilution By Tarnishment
While the dilution by blurring doctrine seeks to protect the
uniqueness and distinctiveness of a mark, the dilution by
tarnishment theory strives to prevent the diminution of the positive,
quality-connoting associations the holder has labored to create
through advertising and promotion. 144 Implicit in this theory is the
notion that a trademark represents the reputation and goodwill of
the holder, which are susceptible to injury. Although the Model
139. Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1040.
140. 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1557 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
141. Id. at 1559-60.
142. See id. This case is also important because the court refused to treat predatory
intent, or the absence thereof, as a relevant factor when determining if likelihood of
dilution existed. Id. at 1560.
143. See Schechter, supra note 26, at 831-33. At least one other case has entertained
a claim for dilution of a color. See R.L. Winston Rod Co. v. Sage Mfg. Co., 838 F.
Supp. 1396, 1400-02 (D. Mont. 1993) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff
fishing rod manufacturer's dilution claim that defendant's use of the color green for its
top-of-the line fishing rods diluted plaintiffs alleged trademark in the color green for a
similar rod; but denying plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief under the state dilution
statute on the grounds that plaintiff had not established that its use of the color green
constituted a valid trademark).
144. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24.13(1)(a)(ii).
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State Trademark dilution provision, and most state dilution statutes,
read as if "injury to business reputation" constitutes a separate
claim from dilution, most courts, and at least one commentator, are
in accord that the former is subsumed by the latter.145 Under the
majority interpretation, injury to business reputation is the likely
result when dilution by tamishment occurs.
146
Dilution by tarnishment can occur in two ways: (1) by the un-
authorized junior use of a senior holder's mark on goods or servic-
es of inferior quality; and (2) by the unauthorized junior use of a
senior holder's mark in an unwholesome context.'47 The concern
of each form of tamishment is that such unauthorized junior use
will produce negative, dissonant associations that will conflict with
and diminish the positive associations connected with the mark as
a symbol of quality. Thus, the tarnishment doctrine seeks to ad-
dress the same concern raised by traditional trademark law in the
licensing area.1 48 If a holder cannot control the use of his mark to
prevent the public from associating it with inferior goods or un-
wholesome subjects, then the selling value of the mark as a symbol
of quality and reliability will eventually diminish.149
Tiffany presents both tarnishment prongs at work. Although the
court also found dilution by blurring, its primary dilution concern
was the likely diminution in the "Tiffany" mark as a symbol of
high quality due to the defendant's continued use. 150 According to
145. See id. § -24.14(2).
146. See, e.g., Accuride Int'l, Inc. v. Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir.
1989) (stating that a claim for "[i]njury to business reputation is typically invoked where
the plaintiff's mark or name is tarnished or degraded through association with something
unsavory").
147. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24.16(1), (3).
148. Of course, the traditional trademark infringement suit requires proof of a confus-
ing use (e.g., on inferior goods) before a court will remedy the tarnishing injury resulting
from such use. See, e.g., Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (discussing post-sale confusion as satisfying the confusion requirement).
The dilution by tarnishment doctrine does not require proof that such use is likely to
confuse.
149. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1190-91
(E.D.N.Y. 1972).
150. Tiffany & Co. v. The Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1964); see
also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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the court, the diminution would result because of the inferior quali-
ty of the defendant's goods and services, -and the unwholesome
context in which the defendant advertised its mark.15 Regarding
the former, the court cited the inferior services provided at the
defendant's restaurant and bar, in addition to the mediocre quality
of a radio program, which the defendant sponsored as part of a
promotion.1 52 Regarding the latter, the court noted that, due to its
clientele, the defendant restaurant and bar primarily advertised on
the same newspaper page as strip joints, night clubs and porno-
graphic movie houses.15 3
Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc.15 4 is another early case
that influenced the development of the "tarnishment by unwhole-
some context" doctrine. In Coca-Cola, the soft drink manufacturer
sought to prevent the defendant poster company from printing and
selling posters depicting the phrase "Enjoy Cocaine" in the same
typescript and with the same red background as the plaintiff's reg-
istered "Coca-Cola" mark, used in the plaintiff's advertising cam-
paign. 155 The plaintiff produced evidence that several customers
had called or written either the plaintiff or local newspapers to
complain about the poster, inquiring about how the company could
sponsor or approve of such drug use, and threatening a boycott of
the plaintiff's products unless it ceased distributing the poster. 156
Apparently, the Coca-Cola company had earlier embarked on an
advertising campaign that utilized its mark in an "Op-Art" context
similar to that of the defendant's poster. 157 The court further took
judicial notice that the plaintiff's original product, bearing the name
"Coca-Cola," had utilized an extract from the Andean coca leaf,
which is the source of cocaine. 158 Based on this evidence, the court
granted injunctive relief under the Lanham Act, finding that the
151. Tiffany, 231 F. Supp. at 843-44.
1152. Id. at 844.
153. Id. at 843.
154. 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
155. Id. at 1186-87.
156. Id. at 1188-90.
157. Id. at 1189-90.
158. Id. at 1189 n.7.
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plaintiff had proved a likelihood of confusion as to source, sponsor-
ship, or approval of the poster in question. 59 The Court further
stated, however, that even in the absence of such confusion, it
would still have granted injunctive relief under New York's dilu-
tion statute. 60 In so holding, the court rejected the defendant's
First Amendment defense. 161
In another early, influential case in the tarnishment area, Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,162 the plain-
tiff company, which handled all the licensing and promotional use
of the name "Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders" and likenesses, sought
to prevent the further distribution of a pornographic movie that the
defendant falsely advertised as starring a former Dallas Cowboys
cheerleader, and which depicted the star wearing various bits of a
costume substantially similar to the Dallas Cowboys cheerleader
costume. 63 As in Coca-Cola, the court's primary focus was on the
trademark infringement count. Although the plaintiff had not prof-
fered any evidence of actual confusion, as did the plaintiff in Coca-
Cola, the court nevertheless found that based upon the deceptive
advertising and use of the substantially similar costume, there was
a showing of a likelihood of confusion regarding the plaintiff's
sponsorship of the movie."6
The court further held, that, even in the absence of confusion,
the defendant had violated the New York dilution statute. 65 The
court's decision was influenced by its finding that the defendant
had misappropriated the plaintiff's name and marks in order to
"cash in on the Dallas Cheerleaders' popularity and attracting pow-
er" in order "to attract customers to view the sex acts in the mov-
ie.'166 According to the court, such use would diminish the "poten-
159. Id. at 1190-91.
160. Id. at 1191-92 (referring to N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW, § 368-d (McKinney 1995)).
161. Id. at 1192-93; see also infra part IV (discussion of First Amendment concerns
raised by the dilution doctrine).
162. 467 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
163. Id. at 369-371.
164. Id. at 376-77.
165. Id. at 377.
166. Id. at 376-77.
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cy" of the plaintiff's mark even in the absence of confusion.167 The
Second Circuit echoed these sentiments in affirming the lower
court's decision, stating "it is hard to believe that anyone who had
seen defendants' sexually depraved film could ever thereafter disas-
sociate it from plaintiffs cheerleaders." 168 Thus both the lower and
appellate courts rejected the defendant's fair use-parody and First
Amendment defenses.1 69
All of the above-mentioned cases reflect the early reluctance of
courts to find dilution by tarnishment without first finding a likeli-
hood of confusion. As in the dilution by blurring area, there are
extant more cases in which courts have found both traditional
trademark infringement and dilution by tarnishment than there are
cases involving solely a finding of dilution by tamishment."7 °
However, just as in the "dilution by bluffing area," there currently
exists a trend in which courts have decided cases based exclusively
on the dilution by tarnishment ground. 71
For example, in Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc.,17 2 the
plaintiff soft drink manufacturer brought a lawsuit claiming both
federal trademark infringement and dilution by the defendant candy
company's sale of a bubble gum product, which came in a white
powder form in a plastic container that closely resembled the clas-
sic Coca-Cola bottle. 73 The court chose to address only the dilu-
167. Id. at 377.
168. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 205.
169. Id. at 205-06; Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 467 F. Supp. at 375-77. For a
discussion of the fair use First Amendment issues raised by this and other cases, see infra
part IV.
170. See, e.g., Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166, 1174-75 (C.D. Cal.
1986) (manufacturer of dog biscuits using the mark "DOGIVA" both infringed and tar-
nished the plaintiffs mark "GODIVA" for high quality chocolate products); Academy of
Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446,
1456-57 (9th Cir. 1991) (defendant's use of "Oscar" design for its own awards statue,
which was made of cheap material, both infringed and diluted the plaintiffs "Oscar"
mark).
171. See, e.g., American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Labs., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
2006 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also infra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
172. 719 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
173. Id. at 726.
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tion count, 174 concluding that both elements of a dilution
claim existed. 75 The court held that the soft drink manufacturer's
mark in its bottle design was strong and distinctive enough to be
protected under the dilution statute, since "Coca-Cola's bottle rep-
resents the archetypical distinctive mark."' 176 The court also found
there was a likelihood of dilution by both blurring and
tamishment. 77 Regarding the latter, the court held that the bubble
gum product, which was labeled ."Magic Powder," closely resem-
bled cocaine. 178 The court further found that by placing the powder
in a container, which strikingly mirrored the plaintiff's bottle, the
defendant's product would trigger a mental association between
cocaine and the plaintiff. 79 According to the court, the association
of "such a noxious substance as cocaine with plaintiff's wholesome
beverage" would clearly have a tendency to impugn that product
and injure plaintiff's business reputation."' 80  Furthermore, the
court, in addressing the "public interest" requirement for a showing
of injunctive relief, found that because trademark protection serves
the public interest, trademark dilution "cannot help but operate to
the public's detriment."' 8'' Accordingly, the court granted the in-
junctive relief requested. 182
American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Laboratories Corp. 18 3
is another recent case that illustrates the increased seriousness with
which courts have embraced the dilution by tarnishment doctrine.
In American Express, the plaintiff financial and travel services
company sought to prevent the further sale of one of the defendant
novelty company's products. The product was a card, the front of
which exactly duplicated an American Express credit card, includ-
174. Id.
175. Id. at 727-28.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 728.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting Coca-Cola Co., 346 F. Supp. at 1189). As in the earlier Coca-Cola
case, the Court took judicial notice of the original Coca-Cola's connection with the
Andean coca leaf, from which cocaine is derived. See id.
181. Id. at 730 (citing Hyatt Corp., 736 F.2d at 1159).
182. Id.
183. 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2006 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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ing the name "American Express," the familiar gladiator logo, and
the colors of the plaintiff's green card. 84 . Inside the card was a
condom with the words, "Never Leave Home Without It," printed
directly opposite it.18 5 The plaintiff possessed registered marks in
the name "American Express," the gladiator logo, and the phrase
"Don't Leave Home Without It."'186 Although the defendant's card
virtually duplicated these marks, and despite the fact that the plain-
tiff had actually received an earlier request to market such a prod-
uct as part of an anti-AIDS campaign, the court rejected the plain-
tiff s federal trademark infringement claim, finding that there was
no likelihood of confusion due to the dissimilarity of the products,
the disparate marketing channels used, and the sophistication of the
plaintiff's customers. 187
However, the court held for the plaintiff on its state dilution
claim holding that the "American Express" mark was a strong
one. 188 The court found that the plaintiff had conducted an exten-
sive advertising campaign, which had "painted a picture of its
charge card as one of quality and prestige, available to only the
most select group of consumers."18 9  Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that "[t]his image provoking characteristic of the [American
Express] trademark[s] establishes its associational qualities which
entitle it to protection from dilution."' 9 The court then noted that
since the defendant's sale of its novelty card, another company had
manufactured a similar "American Express" condom card. 19' Con-
sequently, the court held that allowing the defendant to continue
marketing its card would likely dilute the distinctive, quality-evok-
ing associations of the plaintiffs marks: "[D]efendants' condom
card cannot be shrugged off as a mere bawdy jest, unreachable by
any legal theory. American Express has a legitimate concern that
its own products' reputation may be tarnished by defendants' con-
184. Id. at 2007.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2010-11.
188. Id. at 2012.
189. Id. at 2013.
190. Id. (quoting Toys "R" Us v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189,
1208 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (alterations in original)).
191. Id.
1995]
138 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
duct; and that damage, impossible to quantify and hence irrepara-
ble, will result."' 192
Interestingly, a recent "dilution by tarnishment" case involved
a company that was a party in one of the first dilution cases. 193 In
Eastman Kodak Co, v. D.B. Rakow, 194 the plaintiff photographic
product company brought a federal trademark infringement and
state dilution cause of action against a comedian that had adopted
the name "Kodak" as his stage name. 195 Considering only the dilu-
tion count, the court noted that the defendant's act "includes humor
that relates to bodily functions and sex, and that ... uses crude,
off-color language repeatedly."' 196 The plaintiff had adopted a cor-
porate policy "prohibit[ing] the association of the Kodak mark with
programs that contain 'excessive and gratuitous violence or sexual
themes for their own sake when such material plays no part or
makes no important contribution to a dramatic statement.' ' 1 97 The
plaintiff had spent more than one billion dollars over the previous
five years alone to advertise and promote its products under the
Kodak mark. 198 Based on the foregoing, the court concluded that
the defendant's continued use of the "Kodak" name would likely
dilute the plaintiff's mark both on blurring and tarnishment
grounds.' 99 When so holding, the court cited to Callman's popular-
ization of Schechter's theory, which has become well known in its
own right:
The use of a mark similar [in this case identical] to the
plaintiff's constitutes a trespass upon his property rights in
his mark, for it necessarily involves a gradual impairment
of its selling power; it is analogous to the situation where
the plaintiff's building is demolished because it is carried
away stone by stone. 2 °
192. Id. at 2013-14.
193. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
194. 739 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y. 1989).
195. id. at 117.
196. Id. at 118 (quoting PL's Compl. 26 (No. Civ. 88-300L)).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 119.
199. Id. at 118-20.
200. Id. at 119 (quoting 1954 N.Y. STATE LEGIS. ANN. at 50 (quoting 3 CALLMAN,
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS, p. 1650 (1950))).
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Thus, Kodak and the dilution theory have come full circle.
Once the plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit that inspired
Schechter to articulate dilution as a distinct theory of recovery,2"1
Kodak has reaped the benefits of this theory by successfully assert-
ing it in an action nearly a century later.
C. Dilution By Genericization
As one trademark practitioner recently wrote:
[F]ew trademark issues are as important to trademark own-
ers and their counsel as the relationship between valid
trademarks ... and generic terms .... When and why-
in the eyes of the law-does a famous trademark, known by
many but owned by one party alone, become a generic term
free for all to use?202
The student of trademark law quickly learns that even coined
marks, once strong, can lose their trademark status if, over time,
the primary significance of the mark to the purchasing public
comes to connote the class or genus of goods to which the product
belongs rather than the source of the product.2 3 A trademark hold-
er can take preventive measures in an attempt to keep its mark
strong, but such efforts are not always successful. For example, in
Murphy Door Bed Co., v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc. ,20 the Sec-
ond Circuit held that "Murphy bed" had become a generic term for
a fold-out closet bed. The Murphy Door Bed Company had uti-
lized the term for decades as the unregistered mark for its product,
and had attempted to police its mark by complaining to competitors
to refrain from using the same or similar mark.20 5 According to the
Second Circuit, the use of the term in dictionaries, newspapers and
magazines to refer to a type of bed was strong evidence "of the
general public's perception that Murphy bed connotes something
201. See Eastman Kodak v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 RPC 105 (1898); see also
Pattishall, supra note 7, at 289; supra note 32 and accompanying text.
202. Vincent N. Palladino, Genericness and the Trademark Clarification Act of 1984:
Five Years Later, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 657 (1989).
203. See, e.g., Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 512-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
204. 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989).
205. Id. at 98, 101.
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other than a bed manufactured by the Murphy Co."' 6 Since the
mark had "entered the public domain beyond recall, policing [was]
of no consequence .....,,20
Some trademark practitioners have seized upon the dilution
doctrine in an attempt to find additional Weapons with which to
protect trademarks from genericization. These practitioners argue
that the genericization of a mark is the ultimate form of dilution,
and therefore a plaintiff ought to be able to bring a dilution action
against a defendant that is using the mark in a Way that encourages
the public to view the mark as the product type.2 °8 Thus far, only
a few courts have been receptive to this rationale.
For example, in Selchow & Righter Co. v. McGraw-Hill Book
Co. 209 the manufacturer of the word game, "Scrabble," sought to
prevent the use of its mark, "SCRABBLE," in the title of the de-
fendant's dictionary, "The Complete SCRABBLE DICTIO-
NARY., 2 0  The plaintiff had previously licensed the use of its
name in book titles issued by other publishers. 21 The plaintiff also
had initiated plans to come out with its own dictionary.212 While
the plaintiffs cause of action appears to have been couched in
traditional federal trademark infringement law, the Second Circuit
affirmed the granting of injunctive relief on the grounds that the
defendant's use of the plaintiffs mark in its title could well render
the. mark generic or seriously dilute it. 213
More recently, in Sykes Laboratory, Inc. v. Kalvin,214 the manu-
facturer of a nail hardener and conditioner, which bore its name
"Sykes" and the mark "Perfect Nail," sought to prevent the further
206. id. at 101.
207. Id. (citing King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Alladin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 579
(2d Cir. 1963)).
208. See, e.g., Cyd B. Wolf, Trademark Dilution: The Need For Reform, 74 TRADE-
MARK REP. 311, 313 (1985).
209. Selchow & Righter Co. v. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 580 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1978).
210. Id. at 26.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. id. at 27-28.
214. 610 F. Supp. 849 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
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sale of the defendant's generic version of its product.2 5 The defen-
dant manufactured an entire line of generic cosmetics under its
mark "Generic Brand., 21 6 The defendant labeled its generic version
of the plaintiffs product as the "Generic Brand Version of Sykes'
Perfect Nail,"217 and used the same bottle shape as the plaintiff's
product.21 '8 As part of its display, the defendant listed the Sykes'
product along with several other name brands on a comparison
chart that stated, "If You Like the Name Brand, You'll Love the
GENERIC BRAND. '2 9  The plaintiff brought a multi-pronged
cause of action, including claims for federal trademark infringement
and state dilution. 22' The court dismissed all the claims except for
the state dilution claim. 2
21
Regarding the federal trademark infringement claim, the court
found there was no likelihood of confusion since the defendant's
product was not deceptively labeled.222 In addition, the court also
found that the display was proper under the law governing compar-
ative advertising. 23 It further concluded that the plaintiff's regis-
tered trademark for its bottle design was invalid since the design,
which was largely utilitarian in function, had failed to acquire the
secondary meaning necessary for it to achieve trademark status.
224
However, with respect to the state dilution count, the district
court found that California's dilution law applies to both competi-
tors and non-competitors. 25 Therefore, the court held that applying
the state dilution statute to this case was particularly appropriate,
215. id. at 851.
216. Id. at 851-52.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 852. A bottle shape can serve as a valid trademark only if it has
"achieved that degree of consumer recognition known as 'secondary meaning."' id. at
861. Although the plaintiff had registered its bottle design with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, the court ordered the cancellation of this registration after finding that
the plaintiff had failed in creating secondary meaning for its bottle shape. Id. at 863.
219. Id. at 852.
220. Id. at 851.
221. Id. at 851-52.
222. Id. at 853-55.
223. Id. at 854-55.
224. id. at 861-63.
225. Id. at 856-57.
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because the defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark "'creates a seri-
ous threat to the uniqueness and distinctiveness' of the trademark,
and if continued would create a risk of making... generic ... the
words of which the trademark is composed. 226 Accordingly, the
court upheld the state dilution claim, stating that the plaintiff could
prevail at trial by proving: (1) its mark was strong; (2) the defen-
dant used the mark to identify its own product; and (3) such usage
was likely to render its mark a generic term.227
Sykes raises a series of questions concerning the proper scope
of the dilution doctrine, including whether it should apply to cases
involving competitors as well as questions concerning First Amend-
ment restrictions.228 While this paper addresses these concerns in
part IV below, at this juncture the reader should note that, current-
ly, the Circuits are in disagreement concerning the applicability of
the dilution doctrine to suits involving competitors.
In the Second Circuit, until recently, there was widespread
disagreement between the district courts on this issue. 229 However,
in Nikon Inc. v. Ikon Corp.,230 the Second Circuit definitively held
that the New York dilution statute applies to suits involving com-
petitors as well as non-competitors.231 The Second Circuit ignored
the legislative history that strongly suggested the dilution statute
was intended to provide protection for a mark's use on non-com-
petitive goods. 32 The court, instead, focused on the language of
the statute, which states that it applies in cases "notwithstanding the
absence of competition between the parties. '233 According to the
Second Circuit, this language, on its face, indicates that the pres-
226. Id. at 858 (quoting Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1988)).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 858-859; see also infra part IV.D (discussing First Amendment concerns).
229. Compare Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 182,
214-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (N.Y. dilution statute does not apply to suits between competi-
tors) with Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Bachman Co., 704 F. Supp. 432, 437-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(N.Y. dilution statute applies to suits between competitors).
230. 987 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1993).
231. id. at 96.
232. Id.
233. Id. (quoting N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1984)).
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ence or absence of competition between the parties is irrelevant.3
The Second Circuit subsequently reaffirmed its holding that the
New York anti-dilution statute applies to suits between competitors
in the recent case of Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.235
The Ninth Circuit, however, has not squarely addressed the
issue decided by the Sykes court. Therefore, it is unclear whether
the Ninth Circuit would uphold Sykes' expansion of the dilution
doctrine into suits between competitors. The Seventh Circuit, in
contrast, has definitively held that the Illinois dilution statute236
does not apply to suits between competitors.237 Consequently, in
the Seventh Circuit, if a plaintiff competitor cannot prove a likeli-
hood of confusion in its federal trademark infringement claim, it
cannot launch a second attack on a dilution theory.238
D. Dilution Under Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.
In the recent case of Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.,239 the
Second Circuit expanded the range of suits cognizable under New
York's anti-dilution statute to encompass situations where a com-
petitor's alteration of a company's well-known trademark does not
necessarily result in the blurring or tamishment of the latter's
mark.240 Deere & Co., which is the world's largest supplier of
agricultural equipment, alleged that an Ohio lawn tractor compa-
ny's humorous alteration of the plaintiff's stag deer trademark in
a television commercial violated both the Lanham Act as well as
New York's anti-dilution statute. 241 Regarding Deere's mark, the
court described it as a "static, two-dimensional silhouette of a leap-
ing male deer in profile. 242 The defendant's commercial depicted
234. Id. (quoting LeSportsac v. K Mart, 617 F. Supp. 316, 319 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
235. 41 F.3d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1994); see also infra part III.D.
236. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 765, § 1035/15 (1993).
237. See AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 619 (7th Cir.
1993); see also EZ Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Cox Trailers, Inc., 746 F.2d 375, 380
(7th Cir. 1984).
238. The Seventh Circuit has not clearly articulated its rationale for restricting the
dilution doctrine only to suits between competitors. But see infra part IV.B (explaining
why such a restriction is prudent for most dilution cases).
239. 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
240. Id. at 44. Note that genericization was not a concern in this case.
241. Id. at 41-42.
242. Id. at 41.
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a smaller and wider deer on a lawn tractor, which became animated
when seeing the defendant's competing "Yard-Man" lawn tractor.2 43
In the commercial, the depicted deer looked over its shoulder,
jumped through the logo frame, and ran, "in apparent fear," while
being chased by the Yard-Man lawn tractor and a barking dog.2"
Although Deere's name did not appear on the deer logo, or any-
where else in the commercial, the court found that the defendant's
"intent was to identify Deere as the market leader and convey the
message that Yard-Man was of comparable quality but less costly
than a Deere lawn tractor. 245
Upon a motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court
ignored the federal trademark infringement claim and ruled that the
plaintiff had demonstrated a probability of prevailing on its state
dilution count under- "dilution by bluffing" law.2 46  The district
court then issued a preliminary injunction limited strictly to activi-
ties within New York state.247 The Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's finding of a likelihood of dilution, but for different
reasons.
248
Unlike the district court, the Second Circuit did not believe that
the defendant's use of Deere's trademark in its commercial gave
rise to a likelihood of dilution by blurring because such use posed
"slight if any risk of impairing the identification of Deere's mark
with its products. '2 49 The Second Circuit also did not think that
such use constituted dilution by tarnishment since, according to the
court, "tamishment ... is usually found where a distinctive mark
is depicted in a context of sexual activity, obscenity, or illegal
activity.,,250 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit held that "the blur-
ring/tamishment dichotomy does not necessarily represent the full




246. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 860 F. Supp. 113, 118, 119-21 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
247. Id. at 123 (Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order).
248. Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 44-45.





According to the Second Circuit, the defendant's use of Deere's
logo fell within the proscribed range since it altered a well-known
mark solely to promote, a competing product rather than to make
a satiric or social comment for its own sake.252 In so doing, the
defendant risked "the possibility that consumers will come to attrib-
ute unfavorable characteristics to a mark and ultimately associate
the mark with inferior goods and services. '"253
In Deere, however, the Second Circuit was careful to delineate
the areas in which a seller may lawfully use or refer to the mark
of another. The court noted that a seller of commercial products
may use a competitor's mark to identify the competitor's product
in a comparative advertisement, provided "the mark is not altered,
such use serves the beneficial purpose of imparting factual informa-
tion about the relative merits of competing products and poses no
risk of diluting the selling power of the competitor's mark., 254 In
addition, a satirist may lawfully utilize another's mark in parody
"to make a point of social commentary," as long as the satirist is
only selling the publication that contains the parody and not anoth-
er product. 255 The court further stated that although a commercial
product seller, which alters another's mark, risks running afoul of
New York's anti-dilution statute regardless of whether the product
is competitive or not, greater "leeway -for alterations is appropriate
in the context of satiric expression and humorous ads for noncom-
peting products. 256 The court stressed, however, that as in the case
at bar, dilution "is more likely to be found when the alterations are
made by a competitor with both an incentive to diminish the favor-
able attributes of the mark and an ample opportunity to promote its
products in ways that make no significant alteration, ,257
Consequently, after Deere, a commercial product seller, who
wishes to alter a competitor's mark in an advertisement to make a
humorous point runs the risk of violating New York's anti-dilution
252. Id. at 44-45.
253. id. at 45.
254. Id. at 44.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 45.
257. Id.
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statute. As one commentator has noted, it is questionable whether
the Second Circuit had to create a new dilution category to render
actionable the humorous: use of another's mark to promote one's
own competing product, because the "tarnishment" doctrine seems
broad enough to encompass such a use.2 58  Regardless of whether
Deere is correctly viewed as having created a new dilution catego-
ry, the case illustrates the growing strength of state dilution law.
It also raises potential concerns under the First Amendment, which
protects both commercial and non-commercial expression to vary-
ing degrees.259
III. RECENT INITIATIVES TO ENACT A DILUTION PROVISION
In 1988, the USTA proposed an amendment of the Lanham Act
so as to provide a federal cause of action for either dilution by
blurring or by tarnishment. 260 The dilution by blurring provision,
if enacted, would have created a new § 43(c) that "protects federal-
ly-registered marks that are truly famous from uses that trade upon
their goodwill and exceptional renown and dilute their distinctive
quality. ,261
258. See Howard J. Shire, "Lawn Tractor Manufacturer Pays Dearly for Trademark
Dilution: 'Deere v. MTD' Greatly Expands Protection Provided by Statute," N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 3, 1995, at $7.
259. See infra part IV.D (discussing First Amendment concerns).
260. See USTA Statement, supra note 5, at 404.
261. Id. Section 43(c) would have provided:
(c)(l)The owner of a famous mark registered under the Act ... or on the prin-
cipal register ... shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity, taking
into account, among other things, the good faith use of an individual's name or
an indication of geographic origin, to an injunction against another person's use
in commerce of a mark, commencing after the registrant's mark becomes fa-
mous, which causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the registrant's mark,
and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection. In determining
whether a mark is famous and has distinctive quality, a court shall weigh the
following and other relevant factors:
(A) whether the mark is inherently distinctive or has become distinc-
tive through substantially exclusive and continuous use;
(B) whether the duration and extent of use of the mark are substan-
tial;




The USTA proffered two primary reasons for urging adoption
of a federal dilution provision: "because the absence of dilution
protection creates a serious gap in the protection federal law pro-
vides trademarks and because it offers an important new incentive
encouraging greater use of the federal registration system." '262
Regarding the first purpose, the accompanying report of the
sponsoring Senate bill explained that, although numerous states had
dilution statutes, the court decisions interpreting these statutes were
inconsistent. This "inconsistency, combined with the number of
States that do not have dilution laws, create a patchwork-type of
protection., 263  The USTA-proposed provision was designed to
remedy this problem by providing "consistent national protection
for the tremendous value of famous marks.''264 The Senate Report
further noted that passage of a federal dilution provision would
help the United States in its General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT") negotiations concerning the foreign protection of
U.S. trademarks abroad.265 Since other countries already possess
dilution protection, the federal dilution provision "would show that
(D) whether the geographical extent of the trading area in which the
mark is used is substantial;
(E) whether the mark has substantial renown in its and the other per-
son's trading area and channels of trade; and
(F) whether the same or similar marks are being used substantially by
third parties.
(2) The registrant shall be entitled only to injunctive relief in an action brought
under this subsection, unless the subsequent user willfully intended to trade on
the registrant's reputation or to cause dilution of the registrant's mark. If such
willful intent is proven, the registrant shall also be entitled to the remedies set
forth in §§ 35(a) and 36 hereof, subject to the discretion of the courts and the
principles of equity.
(3) Ownership of a valid registration under the Act . . . or on the principal
register . . . shall be a complete bar to an action brought by another person,
under the common law or statute of a State, seeking to prevent dilution of the
distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form of advertisement.
S. REP. No. 100-515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1988) (quoting S. 1883, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 38 (1988)), reprinted in MCCARTHY, supra note 1, Appendix A5-21.
262. USTA Statement, supra note 5, at 404.
263. S. REP. No. 515, supra note 261, at 7, reprinted in MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
Appendix A5-9.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 7, reprinted in MCCARTHY, supra note 1, Appendix A5-9-10.
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the United States is not asking other countries to give better protec-
tion than it is willing to give .... 266
The proposed amendment would have made federal registration
a defense to a state dilution action. 267 According to the USTA, this
provision would further the second objective by giving "greater
certainty to a federal registrant of its right to use the mark in' com-
merce, without the possibility of attack based on a 'state claim. 268
The legislative history makes clear that the proposed amend-
ment was designed to provide a limited cause 'of action for dilution
by blurring in a narrow class of famous marks. 269 The factors spe-
cifically enumerated in the provision, which determine whether a
mark possesses the threshold level of fame, mirror the factors pre-
viously enunciated by the courts in such decisions as Hyatt Corp.
and Ringling Bros., 270 and are consistent with the analysis proffered
by the Second Circuit in Mead Data.271
The legislative history further reveals that the proposed federal
dilution by blurring provision was not intended to preempt state
dilution law.272 Like the original Lanham Act, the provision was
only designed to provide a nationwide minimum level of dilution
protection. 27' Therefore, states would still be free to increase dilu-
tion protection in their jurisdictions.
As originally proposed, the Senate bill would have amended §
45 of the Act to define dilution as "the lessening of the distinctive
quality of a famous mark through use of the mark by another per-
son, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition be-
266. Id., reprinted in MCCARTHY, supra note 1, Appendix A5-9 (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting statement of Donald J. Quigg, Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks, March 15, 1988).
267. See USTA Statement, supra note 5, at 407.
268. Id.
269. See S. REP. No. 515, supra note 261, at 7, reprinted in MCCARTHY, supra note
1, Appendix A5-9.
270. Hyatt Corp., 736 F.2d at 1157-58; Ringling Bros., 855 F.2d at 482-83; see also
supra part II.
271. See Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1030-32.





tween the users of the. mark, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mis-
take, or deception arising from that use. 274 A later version of the
bill substituted "lessening" with "material reduction" in order to
clarify that the level of harm necessary to render a federal dilution
claim actionable is a material reduction in the distinctiveness of a
famous mark.275 The legislative history, however, is unclear con-
cerning the applicability of the dilution, provision to suits between
competitors as well as non-competitors. Given the "regardless of
the presence or absence of competition" 276 language, it is highly
probable that a court would interpret the provision as applying to
suits between competitors.277
Finally, the USTA proposed "dilution by blurring" provision
would have provided only injunctive relief for the majority of cas-
es.278 However, unlike the current state doctrine, a plaintiff could
seek money damages under the Act for dilution by blurring upon
proof of willful intent.279 Therefore, the existence of predatory
intent would certainly be relevant for a determination of remedies.
Since the statute and legislative history are silent concerning the
relevance or necessity of predatory intent with respect to determin-
ing the substantive issue, likelihood of dilution, the circuits would
no doubt be free to adopt their current practices concerning evalu-
ating predatory intent, or the absence thereof.
The USTA also proposed the amendment of § 43(a) to create
a separate ground for relief for trademark tarnishment and dispar-
agement.280 This amendment would have created a new § 43(a)(3),
providing a civil cause of action, together with any remedies cur:
rently available, for conduct that "is likely to disparage or tarnish
the mark of another., 281
274. See USTA Statement, supra note 5, at 406.
275. S. REP. No. 515, supra note 261, reprinted in MCCARTHY, supra note 1, Ap-
pendix A5-24 (quoting S. 1883 § 38).
276. Id.
277. See, e.g., Nikon Inc., 987 F.2d at 96.
278. S. REP. NO. 515, supra note 261, reprinted in MCCARTHY, supra note 1, Ap-
pendix A5-24 (quoting S. 1883 § 36).
279. Id.; see also USTA Statement, supra note 5, at 407.
280. USTA Review Commission Report § 6 (1988).
281. Id.
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According to the USTA, the tarnishment provision was intended
"to deal with trademark uses which reach beyond parody and hu-
mor, to acts of ridicule and insult that can be highly detrimental to
a trademark owner's goodwill and reputation and can cause the loss
of consumer loyalty and trade., 28 2 The USTA further noted that
dilution and trademark infringement also constituted possible ave-
nues for bringing a tarnishment claim. However, the USTA chose
to put the tarnishment provision in a different section than dilution
by blurring because of concerns that dilution by blurring and
tarnishment sometimes do not fit conceptually.2 3 In so doing, the
USTA apparently intended to make available both money damages
and injunctive relief for a tarnishment plaintiff, since both are cur-
rently available under § 43(a).284
The USTA also recognized that its tarnishment provision could
raise First Amendment concerns. However, because "tarnishment
and disparagement of marks are real injuries," the USTA concluded
that its tarnishment provision was necessary to enable courts to
provide appropriate relief for such injuries.285 In response, several
media organizations and advertising groups voiced First Amend-
ment objections to both the tarnishment and dilution by blurring
provisions. 286 Based upon these objections, the House bill did not
include either provision.28 7 Subsequently, while the bills were in
conference committee, a stalemate ensued. In order to get the bill
out of committee and salvage the rest of the bill, the conference
leaders agreed to delete both provisions.2 8 Thus, neither federal
provision became subject to public debate before Congress.
In March, 1995, Rep. Carlos Moorhead (R-Calif.) introduced
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("FTDA") before the
House of Representatives. 289 Backed strongly by the INTA, the
282. USTA Statement, supra note 5, at 404.
283. Id.
284. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-1117 (1994).
285. USTA Statement, supra note 5, at 404.
286. See H.R. REP. No. 1028, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7 (1988).
287. See id.
288. See Gilson, supra note 16, at 115.
289. See 141 Cong. Rec. H3572 (March 22, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
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American Bar Association, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office,290 as well as the recipient of bipartisan support,291 this feder-
al dilution proposal met with success. The House passed the
FTDA on December 12, 1995,292 and the Senate concurred by pass-
ing it on December 29, 1995.293 On January 16, 1996, President
Clinton signed the FTDA into law.294
The FTDA is substantially similar to the USTA's previously
proposed federal dilution statute. Like its predecessor, the FTDA's
purpose "is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that
blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even
in the absence of a likelihood of confusion., 295 It attempts to ac-
complish this purpose by adding to the Lanham Act a new § 43(c),
which renders actionable the unauthorized commercial use of a
famous mark that "causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark."2 96 Similar to an earlier version of the 1988 proposed federal
dilution provision, the FTDA defines dilution as "the lessening of
the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or
services, regardless of the presence or absence of; (1) competition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2)
290. See 141 Cong. Rec. H14317 (December 12, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Moorhead
prior to House vote on H.R. 1295).
291. See, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. Schroeder, D-CO, in support of H.R. 1295); 141
Cong. Rec. S19312 (December 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy, D-VT, in support of
H.R. 1295).
292. 141 Cong. Rec. H14317 (December 12, 1995), available in LEXIS 1995 Bill
Tracking H.R. 1295.
293. 141 Cong. Rec. S19312 (December 29, 1995), available in LEXIS 1995 Bill
Tracking H.R. 1295.
294. Pub. L. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (January 16, 1996), available in WESTLAW
1995 US H.B. 1295.
295. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (November 30, 1995); 141
Cong. Rec. H14317 (December 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead).
296. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a) (1996). As amended, § 43 of the Lanham Act (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125) now provides in relevant part:
(c)(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles
of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name,
if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in
this subsection.
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likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. 297 Although this
definition is strikingly similar to the "dilution by blurring" defini-
tion contained in the 1988 proposed federal dilution provision, the
FTDA's legislative history makes clear that the Act protects against
both dilution by bluffing and tamishment.29' This history further
reveals that the FTDA's drafters clearly intended its scope to pro-
tect against dilution caused by the unauthorized use of a famous
mark on competitive as well as non-competitive goods.299
The FTDA evinces many other similarities with the 1988 pro-
posed federal dilution provision. For example, it enumerates sever-
al factors determinative of whether a mark is "distinctive and fa-
mous," which are substantially similar to those listed in the USTA-
sponsored bill.3  The FTDA also similarly limits a claimant's
297. Pub. L. No. 109-98, § 4 (1996) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
298. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. H14317 (December 12, 1995) (remarks of Rep.
Moorhead following the reading of H.R. 1295 into the record). Interestingly, unlike the
1988 federal dilution proposal, the FTDA lacks a separate "dilution by tarnishment"
provision, suggesting that its drafters intended its definition of dilution to encompass
"dilution by tarnishment" as well as "dilution by blurring."
299. See H.R. REP. No. 104-374, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (November 30, 1995)
(analyzing H.R. 1295, § 4).
300. Compare S. 1883 § 43(c)(1) (listing factors) with Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a) (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125) (listing similar factors). The Federal Trademark Dilution
Act of 1995 amends § 43 of the Lanham Act to provide in relevant part:
(c)(l)... In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may
consider factors such as, but not limited to-
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods or services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is
used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the
mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and
channels of trade used by the mark's owner and the person against
whom the injunction is sought;
* (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties; and
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881,
or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Pub. L. No. 109-98, § 3 (1996) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1)). Except for the
[Vol. 6:105
THE DILUTION DOCTRINE
remedies to injunctive relief "unless the person against whom the
injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's repu-
tation or to cause dilution of the famous mark., 30 1 Furthermore,
the FTDA also makes federal trademark registration a "complete
bar" to a state dilution action.30 2 Even the justifications for enact-
ment of the FTDA echo those voiced in support of the 1988 federal
dilution provision. 303 Finally, ,like the earlier dilution proposal, the
FTDA is not intended to preempt state dilution law.3 4
The FTDA' s one notable improvement over the earlier federal
dilution proposal is its attempt to address First Amendment con-
cerns raised by critics of the dilution doctrine. 5  The Act pre-
cludes a federal dilution cause of action against the "[flair use of
a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial ad-
vertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services
of the owner of the famous mark.''306 It also renders non-actionable
the noncommercial use of a mark307 as well as its use in news re-
porting and commentary. 8
IV. ASSESSING THE DILUTION DOCTRINE
The dilution doctrine is a controversial'topic that has split com-
mentators and practitioners into opposing camps. On the one hand,
there are those, like Callman and Pattishall, who support adoption
addition of (E) and (F), the FTDA's list of relevant factors is virtually identical to those
posited in the 1988 federal dilution proposal. See supra note 261.
301. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)).
302. Id.
303. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S19310 (December 12, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (arguing that passage of S. 1513 the Senate companion bill to H.R. 1295, is
necessary both to remedy the "patchwork system of protection" afforded by state dilution
laws; and to render the scope of federal trademark protection in the United States consis-
tent with that provided under the GATT); see also S. REP. No. 515, supra note 261, at
7.
304.' H.R. REP. No. 374, supra note 299, at-8; 141 Cong. Rec. S19310 (analyzing
§ 3 of S. 1513, the Senate's companion bill to H.R. 1295.)
305. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. H14317 (December 12, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Moorhead).
306. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(A)).
307. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B)).
308. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(C)).
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of an extremely broad dilution doctrine that seems to have no
bounds.309 At the other extreme is Milton W. Handler, who would
like to see the entire dilution doctrine abolished since he believes
it conflicts with the Lanham Act.310 Both of these positions, how-
ever, suffer from fundamental weaknesses. The more reasonable
stance stems from the center and is articulated by Gilson and Mc-
Carthy, both of whom favor a limited federal dilution statute.31
Yet, even these commentators seem to have overlooked certain
problems raised by the newly enacted federal dilution statute.
While there are numerous criticisms one could make about the
dilution doctrine, the most important ones are: (1) the dilution doc-
trine is too ephemeral, does not address a real injury, and is incapa-
ble of empirical proof;312 (2) the dilution doctrine is unnecessary
given the development of the "related goods" doctrine under tradi-
tional trademark infringement law; 31 3 (3) the dilution theory is
inegalitarian because it only protects strong marks; 314 (4) the dilu-
tion doctrine poses serious First Amendment problems particularly
in the tarnishment area;315 and (5) the dilution doctrine would lead
to an undesired monopolization of language. 3
16
A. Ephemeral Concerns
Some critics of the dilution doctrine have stressed the seeming-
ly "ephemeral" nature of the dilution injury and questioned whether
the injury really exists at all. 317 According to this criticism, while
the dilution doctrine may be rich in metaphors, it is lacking in
309. See, e.g., CALLMAN, supra note 54, § 21.11; Pattishall, supra note 7, at 308-10.
310. See Handler, supra note 26, at 283-87.
311. See Gilson, supra note 16, at 108-09; MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24.19.
312. See, e.g., Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of
Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122, 130-33 (1993) (describing dilution as
a "phenomenon that cannot be seen, measured or otherwise perceived or detected and that,
for sixty-five years, has proven wholly resistant to analysis"); Welkowitz, supra note 58,
at 531, 538-39, 542-43.
313. See Moskin, supra note 312, at 144-45; Welkowitz, supra note 58, at 583.
314. See CALLMAN, supra note 54, § 21.11 (arguing for a more expansive interpreta-
tion of the scope of dilution law).
315. See Welkowitz, supra note 58, at 565-67; see also Maria J. Kaplan, Antidilution
Statutes and the First Amendment, 21 SW. U. L. REV. 1139 (1992).
316. See Handler, supra note 26, at 278-79.




empirical support, and may not be susceptible to empirical proof at
all. In a nutshell, these critics argue, if an unauthorized junior use
on a non-competing product is not likely to produce confusion as
to source, sponsorship, or approval, then the senior mark holder
will not incur any injury.318
This criticism is flawed for two related reasons. First, it as-
sumes that all purchaser confusion is conscious. However, the
power of an effective trademark is that it connotes both conscious
and unconscious associations.319 Some courts have recognized this
fact in the traditional trademark infringement context and termed
the confusion created by the unconscious associations generated by
an unauthorized junior use of a senior holder's mark "subliminal
confusion. ' 320 This term describes confusion concerning the quality
of the junior user's goods, not the source, sponsorship, or approval
of the goods.321 In cases involving subliminal confusion, the junior
user seeks to enter the same market as the senior holder and to
compete against the senior holder while spending less on its adver-
tising expenses. By adopting a mark that is similar-albeit not
identical-to the senior holder, the junior user attempts to generate
unconscious associations concerning the quality of his goods.322
The junior user also intends that the potential consumer who per-
ceives the mark will unconsciously imbue his mark with the posi-
tive associations generated by the senior holder's mark and con-
clude that the junior user's goods must be of the same quality as
the senior mark holder's goods. In short, the junior user is at-
tempting to take a free ride on the selling power, or "commercial
magnetism," of the senior holder's mark in order to become com-
petitive.323
318. See generally Moskin, supra note 312; Welkowitz, supra note 58.
319. See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 486 F.
Supp. 414, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 687 F.2d 563, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1982).
320. Id. at 428.
321. Playboy Enterprises, 687 F.2d at 567-68.
322. Playboy Enterprises, 486 F. Supp. at 428-29.
323. See Steven H. Hartman, Subliminal Confusion: The Misappropriation of Adver-
tising Value, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 506, 508 (1988). While Hartman approves of the judi-
cial development of the "subliminal confusion" doctrine, he indicates that it is distinct
from the dilution phenomenon. id. at 507-08. This Article suggests that an analogous
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For example, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Chuckleberry Pub-
lishing, Inc. ,324 the publisher of Playboy magazine sought to prevent
the further distribution of a similar magazine entitled "Playmen."
The Southern District of New, York found that a likelihood of con-
fusion existed, stating that such confusion was the likely result of
the "defendants' ability to gain a foothold in plaintiff's market by
exploiting subliminal or conscious association with plaintiff's well-
known name. 325
Similarly, in Grotrian, Helfferich, Schultz, Th. Steinweg Nachf
v. Steinway & Sons,326 the famous piano manufacturer sought in-
junctive relief under the Lanham Act to prevent a competitor from
using the mark "Grotrian-Steinweg" on the defendant's pianos. 327
Finding that likelihood of confusion existed, the Second Circuit
explained:
It is the subliminal confusion apparent in the record as to
the relationship, past and present, between the corporate
entities and the products that can transcend the competence
of even the most sophisticated consumer.
Misled into an initial interest, a potential Steinway buyer
may satisfy himself that the less expensive Grotrian-
Steinweg is at least as good, if not better, than a Steinway
.... The issue here is not the possibility that a purchaser
would buy a Grotrian-Steinweg thinking it was actually a
Steinway or that Grotrian had some connection with
Steinway and Sons. The harm to Steinway, rather, is the
likelihood that a consumer, hearing the "Grotrian-Steinweg"
name and thinking it had some connection with "Steinway,"
would consider -it on that basis. The "Grotrian-Steinweg"
name therefore would attract potential customers based on
the reputation built up by Steinway in this country for many
process is at work in the dilution area as well.
324. 486 F. Supp. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 687 F.2d.563 (2d Cir. 1982).
325. id. at 428.
326. 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).




Although the above-mentioned cases involved competing goods,
the "subliminal confusion" rationale appears equally applicable to
cases involving non-competing goods. In fact, "subliminal confu-
sion" is the best theory to describe the phenomenon that the dilu-
tion doctrine seeks to address. This phenomenon requires an ex-
tremely strong mark, which will invite unauthorized uses to conjure
up unconscious associations of quality and reliability. However,
these associations properly refer to-and belong only-to the se-
nior mark holder and its business. Although a potential customer
may not be consciously confused when seeing the senior holder's
mark on a very different, non-competing product, the customer may
be induced to purchase the junior user's goods due to of the uncon-
scious associations of quality triggered iy the same or substantially
similar mark.
For example, if unrelated companies were allowed to use the
mark "Sony" on candy bars, deodorant, liquid detergent, drain
cleaner, or soda, a potential consumer may not be confused con-
cerning the source, sponsorship or approval of the goods in ques-
tion. Customers may in fact consciously think that, since the goods
are so different, there can be no connection between the consumer
electronics company and the item in question. On the other hand,
customers may be initially attracted to the item and in fact be' in-
duced to purchase the item because of the use of the "Sony" mark.
He could very well think, consciously or not, that if the company
chose the "Sony" name to represent its goods, they must be of
superior quality.
If the goods failed to live up to the purchaser's expectations of
superior quality only once, there probably would not be any detri-
mental effect to the senior mark holder. But a consumer might
continue trying different products bearing the "Sony" name primar-
ily because of an initial attraction by the positive associations of
quality conjured up by the name. In each such case the consumer
could well believe that because the goods are so different from
328. id. at 1341-42 (quoting 365 F. Supp. 707, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
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consumer electronics products, it is unlikely that Sony produced,
sponsored or approved the goods in question. If the consumer
continues to experience disappointment and anger because of inferi-
or quality, in time the name "Sony" on any product may conjure
up, for this individual, negative associations as well as positive
ones. Indeed, the negative ones could well eclipse the positive
ones, resulting in real injury to the senior mark holder.
This leads to the second, related flaw of this criticism. The
"ephemeral" criticism assumes that consumers are rational creatures
who make purchasing decisions primarily, if not exclusively, on the
basis of logic. This, however, is far from true. Purchasers make
decisions based on a complex number of factors, some rational,
some emotional, some conscious, and some unconscious.329 Some-
times, the emotional, unconscious associations triggered by a mark
can dwarf the rational considerations.33° Witness, for example, the
phenomenon of brand loyalty.33' If a consumer continues to have
negative experiences with non-competing goods bearing the senior
holder's mark, it is plausible that the negative associations, con-
scious or unconscious, which the mark now triggers with residual
positive ones, could well preclude the consumer from purchasing
a consumer electronics product from Sony. When getting ready to
make a purchase, the frustrated consumer could well think, "I am
sick of being disappointed by products bearing the mark 'Sony."'
Thus, he may forego an opportunity to purchase a high quality
Sony television or stereo, despite the fact that the consumer knows
Sony did not make or sponsor the disparate, inferior goods.
There is a phenomenon in psychology known as "transfer-
ence," 332 which explains the development of a dilution-caused inju-
329. See, e.g., Playboy Enterprises, 486 F. Supp. at 428 ("advertising and trademarks
rely on impressions" to conjure up "vague" or "subliminal" feelings in order to induce
a consumer to purchase a particular article (quoting Londontown Mfg. Co. v. Cable
Raincoat Co., 371 F. Supp. 1114, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1974))).
330. See id.
331. See Moskin, supra note 312, at 134-36.
332. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1253 (Merriam-
Webster, Inc. 1990), which defines "transference" as "the redirection of feelings and
desires and especially of those unconsciously retained ... toward a new object ......
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ry. "Transference" occurs when some person or event triggers
unconscious, negative associations in an individual, stemming from
a completely unrelated person or event.333 The individual, unknow-
ingly, transfers these negative emotions and thoughts to the inno-
cent party, causing the individual to react to the innocent party as
if the innocent party had actually produced the negative associa-
tions.334 This transference process is irrational and unconscious,
but nonetheless real.335
Such a process may well explain how dilution can result in a
real injury to the senior mark holder. The "subliminal confusion-
transference" phenomenon also illustrates that, although capable of
logical distinction, the "dilution by blurring" theory is in actuality
intertwined with the "dilution by tarnishment" doctrine. In each
situation, the senior mark holder fears that his inability to prevent
the unauthorized use of its mark on non-competing goods, without
any sort of licensing control, will result in its mark being associat-
ed with inferior goods; or at least with goods that are incompatible
and conflict with the image that the senior holder has attempted to
convey through its mark. Such unauthorized use could produce a
result analogous to that caused by naked licensing-the diminution
in the selling power or "commercial magnetism" of its mark.
The question thus remains whether this "subliminal confusion-
transference phenomenon" is susceptible to empirical proof. Unfor-
tunately, there is a dearth of empirically oriented research in the
dilution area.336 However, some empirical research in the market-
ing strategy area suggests that the consumer's mind irrationally
retains unpleasant associations with a product, despite the knowl-
edge that the associations are unjustified. For example, one study
indicated that "efforts to directly refute a false rumor (e.g., that
McDonald's uses worms in its hamburger meat) may only cause
333. For a psychoanalytic explanation of the "transference" phenomenon, see
SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE 38-40 (8th ed. 1967).
334. See id.
335. Id.
336. But see Alexander F. Simonson, How and When Do Trademarks Dilute: A
Behavioral Framework to Judge 'Likelihood' of Dilution, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 149
(1993).
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the mind to more deeply encode the damaging information." '337
Similarly, another study demonstrated that the greater the number
of associations triggered by a word, the more difficult it becomes
for an individual to conjure up the word at a later time.338
These findings provide direct support for the dilution theory.
Although a consumer may know that the senior holder neither pro-
duced, sponsored or approved of the inferior product that created
the negative associations, the consumer may still irrationally seek
to disassociate oneself from any item bearing the mark, including
the senior holder's products. The multiple use of a senior holder's
mark on non-competing, incompatible goods could conjure up neg-
ative associations if the goods are of inferior quality; or such use
could trigger a negative response that the mark has become com-
monplace, and no longer designates an item of particular style or
quality.339 In either situation, the negative associations triggered by
the Unauthorized use conflicts with the positive associations intend-
ed by the senior holder's use. Moreover, the knowledge that the
senior holder did not produce, sponsor or approve of the inferior or
incompatible, commonplace items may not prevent the consumer
from transferring these negative associations to the senior holder's
mark.
These empirical findings may encourage trademark practitioners
to attempt empirical proof of dilution. Eventually, as courts elabo-
rate upon the evidentiary factors necessary to prove likelihood of
dilution, as the Second Circuit did in Mead, the use of survey evi-
dence could become more frequent.340 For example, it seems possi-
337. See Moskin, supra note 312, at 147 n.108 (citing A. Tybout et al., Using Infor-
mation Processing Theory to Design Marketing Strategies, 18 J. MARKETING RES. 79
(1981)).
338. See id. at 136 n.53 (citing J. Meyers-Levy, The Influence of a Brand Name's
Association Set Size and Word Frequency on Brand Memory, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 197
(1989)).
339. For an example of the latter, see Steinway & Sons v. Robert Demars & Friends,
210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 954 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (use of piano manufacturer's famous mark on
defendant's "beer mug" holders constituted both trademark infringement and dilution).
340. For the most part, Judge Sweet's factors are helpful for determining likelihood
of dilution. See Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1035 (Sweet, J. concurring). However,
one of the factors, "similarity of the products," does not make much sense in the dilution
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ble to create a survey attempting to verify a potential dilution effect
by an unauthorized junior use. In such a survey, a prospective
consumer would be shown a famous mark, such as "Sony." The
surveyor would then show the consumer a list of items on non-
competing products bearing the same or substantially similar mark.
The survey's next question would ask the consumer if the junior
use reminded him of any company. If the consumer answered
"Sony," then the survey would inquire whether the consumer be-
lieved that Sony produced, sponsored, or approved of the products
in question. If the consumer answered "yes," then the survey
would continue with a series of questions confirming a "likelihood
of confusion" finding. If the consumer answered "no," then the
survey would continue with a list of questions to test whether the
junior uses would result in dilution. The survey would present
various hypotheticals involving the use of non-competing goods
bearing the "Sony" mark and questions inquiring whether the con-
sumer would be more likely to buy such goods bearing the Sony
name. If so, the survey would require the assumption that the
consumer has purchased the goods, and has found that the goods
are either of inferior quality or were commonplace items. The
survey would then ask the consumer what thoughts or emotions
were triggered upon seeing the Sony name? If the consumer re-
sponded in a negative manner, then assuming the survey was prop-
erly drafted and conducted, such evidence should be admissible to
prove a likelihood of dilution.
Thus, the criticism that the dilution doctrine is too ephemeral,
does not address a real injury, and is incapable of empirical proof
is not valid. Instead, dilution appears to be a real phenomenon
susceptible to scientific inquiry. In an age of intense competition,
the blurring or besmirching of the distinctiveness of a mark could
well result eventually in lost sales. Consequently, injunctive relief
should at least be available to combat this phenomenon.
context since the primary reason for adopting the dilution doctrine is to extend protection
to noncompetitive goods. Thus, courts should discard this factor and, instead, substitute
more relevant ones, such as evidence of other similar, unauthorized uses, as existed in the
American Express case. See American Express Co., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2013.
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B. Redundancy Concerns
Perhaps the most potent criticism of the dilution doctrine is that
it is not necessary. 341 As discussed above, the dilution theory first
evolved at a time when trademark protection to shield a mark from
its unauthorized use on non-competing goods was unavailable.342
With the rise of the related goods doctrine under the Lanham
Act,343 this is no longer the case. 344 Rather than having to prove
confusion as to source, a plaintiff may now prove likelihood of
confusion as to sponsorship or approval. In addition, courts have
stretched the confusion concept under the Lanham Act to encom-
pass reverse confusion,345 post-sale confusion,346 and subliminal
confusion.347 Therefore, in the large majority of cases, a dilution
count is redundant.348
The rise of the related goods doctrine has diminished the need
for a federal dilution statute. In an age of mergers, acquisitions,
and rampant trademark licensing, it is easier to prove a likelihood
of confusion regarding source, sponsorship, or approval than in
Schechter's day. However, because of the vast difference in prod-
uct type, marketing channels, and customer base, and due to an
inability to bridge the gap, a plaintiff may still be unable to prove
the requisite likelihood of confusion under a traditional trademark
341. See Welkowitz, supra note 58, at 545, 548-50.
342. See Schechter, supra note 26, at 825; see also supra part I.
343. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (1994).
344. See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 24.19.
345. See Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365
(10th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978). In the typical trademark infringe-
ment suit, the trademark owner seeks to prevent a subsequent, "junior" user of the same
or similar mark from trading on the goodwill associated with the senior user's mark and
causing consumers to mistake the defendant's products as emanating from the plaintiff.
Id. In a "reverse confusion" case, the subsequent user of the mark is in actuality more
well known than the senior mark holder. Therefore, in such a case, the plaintiff is seek-
ing to prevent consumers from mistakenly believing that the plaintiff's products derive
from the defendant. Id.
346. See Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir.
1993). "Post-sale" confusion refers to the confusion experienced by a consumer other
than the direct purchaser of an item upon seeing an allegedly infringing mark on the item.
Id. The potential consumer may see the item being carried or worn by the direct purchas-
er subsequent to the sale of the item. Id.
347. See Playboy, 486 F. Supp. at 428.
348. See Welkowitz, supra note 58, at 548-50.
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infringement claim.349 In addition, thus far the subliminal confu-
sion theory has only been applied to trademark infringement suits
between competitors. Consequently, in suits between non-competi-
tors, a plaintiff ought to be able to assert A dilution claim in addi-
tion to any other relevant claim.
In suits between competitors, however, the redundancy criticism
is well taken. In the vast majority of cases involving competitors,
if an unauthorized use is likely to dilute, it will also be likely to
confuse regarding source, sponsorship or approval.350 Accordingly,
a competitor in a trademark dilution action should only be allowed
to prevail in exceptional circumstances. The most compelling cir-
cumstance would be to prevent the genericization of a mark, as the
court recognized in Sykes Laboratory, Inc. v. Kalvin.35' However,
because Sykes raises some comparative advertising and First
Amendment concerns, a plaintiff should be required to meet a rig-
orous standard of proof in the "dilution by genericization" situation.
As the Sykes court noted, the defendant was legally able to label
and advertise its product as being like or even better than the plain-
tiff's product.3 5 2 One could rationally argue that labeling the defen-
dant's product as the "Generic Brand" Version of Sykes' "Perfect
Nail" was merely a short-hand way of informing the consumer that
the defendant's product is like the plaintiffs product. If this was
a truthful statement, then under the law of comparative advertising,
there should be no liability. 353 Therefore, the only way that a
plaintiff should be allowed to prevail in such a case is by proffer-
ing actual evidence that the use of a label, as opposed to an accom-
349. See, e.g., Hyatt Corp., 736 F.2d at 1156-57; American Express Co., 10
U.S.P.Q.2d at 2009-12.
350. See, e.g., Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Creative House
Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1456-57 (9th Cir. 1991) (precluding use of Academy's
"Oscar design" by unrelated corporation for statue distributed as award for corporate
excellence on traditional trademark infringement and dilution grounds); McDonald's Corp.
v. McBagel's, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1279-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (prohibiting use of
plaintiff's "Mc" family mark by defendant's bagel shop on grounds of both likelihood of
confusion and dilution); see also supra note 78.
351. 610 F. Supp. 849, 857 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
352. id. at 854-55.
353. See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1968).
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panying comparative advertising display, was causing consumers
to utilize the plaintiff's mark as the name of the generic product.
As the court in Sykes noted, however, this burden is a tough stan-
dard to meet.31
4
Similarly, because of intrinsic First Amendment concerns, a
federal dilution cause of action should only allow a competitor to
prevail in a "Deere" type case after meeting a rigorous burden of
proof that the humorous alteration of the plaintiff's mark, in a com-
parative advertisement, was actually causing a diminution of posi-
tive associations related to the mark in the public's mind. As ex-
plained in greater detail below, it is highly questionable whether
the plaintiff in Deere met this burden of proof.355
Accordingly, the drafters of the FTDA should have made abun-
dantly clear that the statute's primary, underlying, purpose is to
prevent the diminution ofa mark's selling power by its unautho-
rized use on non-competitive goods. One way to accomplish this
would have been to change the relevant language from "regardless
of the presence or absence of competition" to "despite the absence
of competition" or "in the absence of competition." This would
have been consistent with the doctrine's origins and also would
have helped prevent an unintended monopolization of language.
However, the statute could have further stated that, in the interests
of equity, and under highly unusual circumstances, a court could
make an exception to the rule and allow a dilution claim to exist
in a suit between competitors. In the statute's legislative history,
the drafters should have clarified that, while this "exceptions"
clause was meant to encompass the Sykes and Deere types of cases,
a plaintiff could only prevail in such a case upon a showing of
actual, clear and convincing evidence of dilution.
C. Inegalitarian Concerns
Some commentators have argued that the level of distinctive-
ness required for dilution protection should be the same as that
required for traditional trademark protection.356 Under this expan-
354. See Sykes, 610 F. Supp. at 858-59.
355. See infra part IV.D.
356. See CALLMAN, supra note 54, § 21.11.
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sive view, virtually every valid trademark would qualify for dilu-
tion protection, no matter how well known.
-The level of distinctiveness required to trigger dilution protec-
tion is an unresolved issue among the Circuits. 357  The majority
opinion in the Second Circuit's Mead decision wisely held that,
before dilution protection would apply, a plaintiff must prove that
its mark is not only strong, but famous among the general public
as well.358 Certainly if the defendant's market is nationwide, then
the plaintiff's mark must be famous on a nationwide basis. Conse-
quently, the fact that a plaintiffs mark is well known in a narrow
product or geographic market would not be sufficient to trigger
dilution protection. 9
. However, those New York district court cases that have found
dilution following Mead Data Central, Inc. have quoted either
Sweet's concurring opinion, in which he stated that strong, local
marks or marks in a narrow product area could qualify for dilution
protection; 360, or else have quoted dicta in the majority opinion and
misread it to mean that distinctiveness, for dilution purposes, is the
same as distinctiveness for trademark infringement purposes.361
This clearly was not the majority opinion's intent.362
The distinctiveness issue is just as muddled in other circuits.
For example, the Seventh Circuit posits the requirement of a dis-
tinctive mark without elaborating on the level of distinctiveness
required.363 In practice, however, it has primarily applied the doc-
trine only to very strong marks. 364 The Ninth Circuit has defini-
tively held that the dilution doctrine only applies to strong marks,365
357. See, e.g., Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1030-31 (dilution protection afforded
only to "famous" marks); Hyatt Corp., 736 F.2d at 1157-58 (in a dilution action, a plain-
tiff must prove its mark is "distinctive"); Accuride Int'l Inc. v. Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d
1531, 1539 (9th Cir. 1989) (dilution protection applies only to "strong" marks).
358. Mead, 875 F.2d at 1030-31.
359. Id.,
360. See Stern's Miracle-Gro, 823 F. Supp. at 1090.
361. See Kraft Gen. Foods, 831 F. Supp. at 134.
362. See Mead Data Cent., 875 F.2d at 1031.
363. See Hyatt Corp., 736 F.2d at 1157.
364. See, e.g., Ringling Bros., 855 F.2d at 482.
365. See Accuride Int'l, 871 F.2d at 1539.
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but has never clarified whether this means strong, nationally fa-
mous marks or strong, locally famous marks. Other circuits have
held that dilution protection extends to strong local marks as well
as nationally famous marks.366
In order to clarify this confusion and definitively establish the
threshold level of distinctiveness required to trigger dilution protec-
tion, the United States acted prudently in adopting the FTDA. The
new Lanham Act provision, § 43(c)(1), is fully congruent with the
majority opinion's analysis in Mead Data Central, Inc.. By re-
stricting the class of plaintiffs to those possessing famous marks,
which in most instances will mean nationwide fame, the statute
should help ensure that the requisite mental association between the
junior and senior use in the purchaser's mind exists. Hopefully, it
also will keep the dilution doctrine true to its roots and prevent it
from overwhelming and usurping traditional trademark doctrine.
Limiting dilution protection to famous marks comports with the
rational structure of the Lanham Act and does not represent an
inegalitarian deviation. The Federal Circuit has succinctly ex-
plained that, under the Lanham Act, famous marks are given great-
er protection than less strong marks because the former are more
susceptible to exploitation by free riders:
A competitor can quickly calculate the economic advantag-
es of selling a similar product in an established market
without advertising costs. These incentives encourage com-
petitors to snuggle as close as possible to a famous mark.
This court's predecessor recognized that a mark's fame
creates an incentive for competitors "to tread closely on the
heels of [a] very successful trademark". . . . Recognizing
the threat to famous marks from free riders, this court's
predecessor allowed "competitors [to] come closer" to a
weak mark .... A strong mark, on the other hand, casts
a long shadow which competitors must avoid.
Thus, the Lanham Act's tolerance for similarity between
competing marks varies inversely with the fame of the prior
366. See Ameritech, Inc., 811 F.2d at 965.
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mark. As a mark's fame increases, the Act's tolerance for
similarities in competing marks falls.
The FTDA is completely congruent with and reflects the above-
mentioned, longstanding federal trademark practice.
D. First Amendment Concerns
By its very nature the dilution doctrine raises First Amendment
concerns, because there is no "likelihood of confusion" requirement
to act as a safeguard against infringement of a defendant's First
Amendment right.368
Although trademark law primarily deals with commercial
speech, under recent U.S.* Supreme Court law commercial speech
is nonetheless entitled to First Amendment protection.369 Unlike
noncommercial speech, however, commercial speech receives only
limited First Amendment protection. 370 Furthermore, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has clearly stated that deceptive or misleading speech
is not protected by the First Amendment. 371  Accordingly, under
traditional trademark infringement law, if a likelihood of confusion
is found, a court need not address the First Amendment question.
The likelihood of confusion requirement thus acts as a brake to
safeguard First Amendment rights in the commercial arena.372
Obviously, no such safeguard exists in the dilution area since
likelihood of confusion is not a requirement. Therefore, some
commentators have expressed grave concern about the very consti-
tutionality of the dilution doctrine, whether state or federal.373 A
state dilution claim may raise a First Amendment issue just as
readily as a federal dilution claim, because the requisite state action
367. Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., 963 F.2d 350, 353 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(alterations in original) (citations omitted).
368. See Langvardt, supra note 24, at 649, 653-57.
369. See Board of Trustees of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,475-81
(1989); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976).
370. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562-63.
371. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
372. See Langvardt, supra note 24, at 649-50.
373. See Welkowitz, supra note 58, at 565-67; Kaplan, supra note 315, at 1139-40.
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occurs when a federal court enforces a state dilution statute in
violation of a defendant's First Amendment rights.374
However, this was not always the case. In the early period of
the dilution doctrine some courts erroneously refused to entertain
a First Amendment defense in a trademark infringement and dilu-
tion case on the grounds that a trademark right was like a real
property right.3 " Accordingly, the infringer was treated like a
trespasser. Under then prevailing Supreme Court precedent, if
alternative avenues of expression existed, then the infringer had no
First Amendment right. In the trademark area, since a defendant
usually could have adopted a different mark than the plaintiffs
mark, a court would usually find that no First Amendment right
was implicated.376
Then came the "constitutionalization" of state tort law under
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan377 and its progeny.378 Under this
doctrine, a federal court violates a defendant's First Amendment
right, in a state libel action, if it finds and enforces a judgment
against the defendant without taking certain procedural and sub-
stantive steps. These steps ensure that a defendant's First Amend-
ment rights are upheld.379
Recently, there has commenced a similar "constitutionalization"
of U.S. trademark law. The analytical work and case law in this
area convince this author that the FTDA would probably withstand
constitutional muster if certain judicial safeguards are adopted. As
a preliminary matter, in order to ensure that noncommercial speech
retains its full First Amendment protection, the FTDA was correct
in clarifying that neither dilution by blurring nor tamishment is
actionable in cases where the alleged dilution consists of parody,
satire, social-political commentary, or other forms of noncommer-
374. See Langvardt, supra note 24, at 653-55.
375. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206.
376. See id.
377. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).





cial expression.8 ° Recent case law makes clear that in suits involv-
ing the noncommercial use of a plaintiff's mark, whether in the
form of parody or social-political commentary, a defendant's First
Amendment right takes precedence over the plaintiff's right to
protect his mark from diluting or otherwise infringing uses.3"' By
changing the USTA-proposed federal dilution provision to reflect
this recent case law, the FTDA's drafters apparently, silenced a
large percentage of the earlier proposal's critics, most of whom
were media representatives. 382
However, this change, alone, is not sufficient to safeguard a
defendant's First Amendment rights, because it is not always easy
to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech.
Moreover, even if the defendant's use is found to constitute com-
mercial speech, its speech is entitled to receive limited First
Amendment protection provided it is not deceptive or misleading.
The U.S. Supreme Court's test for identifying commercial
speech is whether it essentially exists to propose a commercial
transaction. 3  In the trademark area, for a certain set of cases, this
is not always an easy test to apply.384 In recent years, it has be-
come apparent that the use of a plaintiff's mark can involve mixed
speech, i.e., speech that involves both commercial and noncommer-
cial aspects. These cases usually involve the unauthorized printing
of a logo, which is substantially similar to the plaintiff's mark, on
a t-shirt, poster or some other item.38 5 In these cases, a court must
determine which type of speech predominates. The mere fact that
a defendant is selling an item for profit does not render its use
380. See Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) and
(C)); see also 141 Cong. Rec. H14317 (December 12, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Moorhead).
381. See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31-33 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013 (1987); Girl Scouts of U.S.A. v. Bantam Doubleday
Dell Publishing Group, 808 F. Supp 1112, 1118-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 996 F.2d 1477,
1478 (2d Cir. 1993).
382. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. S19310 (December 29, 1995) (supporting statement
of Sen. Hatch); see also H.R. REP. No. 1028, supra note 286, at 5-6.
383. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983).
384. See Langvardt, supra note 24, at 638-39.
385. See id.
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commercial speech.386 Rather, the test is whether the defendant has
used the plaintiffs mark to express an idea rather than simply to
propose a commercial transaction.387
For example, in Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak,388
the plaintiff insurance company brought a federal trademark in-
fringement action to prevent the further distribution of the defen-
dant's t-shirts, mugs and other items that depicted a parody of the
plaintiff's famous Indian mark. 389 The defendant designed his
mark, the "Mutant of Omaha," ostensibly to reflect his anti-nuclear
weapon stance.3' The Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant's First
Amendment-parody defense on the grounds that, under the totality
of circumstances, his speech had become primarily commercial.39'
He had created a whole line of "Mutant of Omaha" items that he
sold in various locations. Accordingly, the court found that the
plaintiff's right to be free from infringing uses prevailed over the
defendant's First Amendment right.392
Nevertheless, because commercial speech is still entitled to
limited First Amendment protection, additional safeguards in the
dilution context are required. Under the current prevailing Su-
preme Court standard, governmental action that restricts commer-
cial speech does not violate a defendant's First Amendment right
if the government possesses a substantial underlying interest and
the government action directly advances the underlying interest by
a narrowly tailored means. 393
Due to a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, the Supreme
Court would likely determine that the FTDA is constitutional under
the above-mentioned test. In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.
v. United States Olympic Committee,394 the Supreme Court held that
386. See id. at 645-46.
387. See id. at 644-49.
388. 836 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988).
389. Id. at 398.
390. Id. at 400.
391. Id. at 401-02.
392. Id.
393. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
394. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
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a federal statute, which granted the defendant the exclusive right to
use the word, "Olympic," as a mark for both commercial and non-
commercial purposes, was not unconstitutional on either First or
Fifth Amendment grounds.395 The defendant was the sponsor of a
gay athletic competition that sought to use the words, "Gay Olym-
pic Games," on t-shirts, posters, banners, buttons and other items
to promote its event. The plaintiff, which was the official U.S.
Olympic sponsoring committee, brought an action for injunctive
relief in order to assert its rights under the statute to control exclu-
sively the word, "Olympic. ' 396 The lower court granted the injunc-
tive relief, which was affirmed on appeal.397
When appealing to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued
that the statute incorporated only the trademark rights embodied in
the Lanham Act. Accordingly, the only protection that the plaintiff
possessed was against uses that were likely to confuse. The defen-
dant argued that the First Amendment dictated such a "likelihood
of confusion" requirement. 39 The Supreme Court rejected this
argument, holding that Congress acted reasonably when it deter-
mined that "the USOC should not be required to prove that an
unauthorized use of the word 'Olympic' is likely to confuse the
public. '399 First, the Court noted that most of the promotional uses
desired by the defendant constituted commercial speech, which
received only limited protection.4° Second, it found that Congress
had several substantial interests that it sought to advance when
enacting the Olympic enabling statute. The first interest mentioned
by the Court was, "as with other trademarks ... to ensure that the
USOC receives the benefit of its own efforts so that the USOC will
have an incentive to continue to produce a 'quality product,' that,
in turn, benefits the public."' 4°
395. Id. at 527-28.
396. Id. at 527.
397. International Olympic Comm. v. San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Inc., 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 982, 987-88 (N.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd, 781 F.2d 733, 737-38 (9th Cir.
1986), aff'd, 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
398. San Francisco Arts and Athletics, 483 U.S. at 531-32.
399. Id. at 535.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 537.
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The Court further held that the speech restrictions embodied in
the statute were "not broader than Congress reasonably could have
determined to be necessary to further these interests. 40 2 According
to the Court, Congress could have reasonably determined that unau-
thorized uses of Olympic words and symbols, "even if not confus-
ing, nevertheless may harm the USOC by lessening the distinctive-
ness and thus the commercial value of the marks." 403 The Court
thus concluded that "[e]ven though this protection may exceed the
traditional rights of a trademark owner in certain circumstances, the
application of the Act to this commercial speech is not broader
than necessary to protect the legitimate congressional interest and
therefore does not violate the First Amendment.
404
Under San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Inc., it is therefore
likely that the Court would consider a state or federal governmental
interest in protecting its citizens' trademarks from dilution to be a
substantial governmental interest. Although the above-mentioned
case involved a different statute than the Lanham Act,4 °5 the
Court's citation to Schechter and the dilution doctrine, as well as
the longstanding importance placed on protection of trademark
rights, strongly suggests that the first prong of the commercial
speech test would be easily met.
Similarly, the FTDA would also likely succeed under the sec-
ond prong of the commercial speech test as long as courts adapt
certain additional safeguards when interpreting the FTDA. The
new federal dilution provision creates a limited federal cause of ac-
tion for a narrow class of plaintiffs whose interests have long been
afforded strong protection under the Lanham Act. It also provides
for injunctive relief as the sole remedy in most instances. In order
402. Id. at 539.
403. Id. (quoting Schechter, supra note 26, at 825, for the proposition that "one
injury to a trademark owner may be '[the] gradual whittling away or dispersion of the
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name' by nonconfusing uses").
404. San Francisco Arts and Athletics, 483 U.S. at 540.
405. It instead required the Supreme Court to construe the Amateur Sports Act, 36
U.S.C. § 380, which granted the USOC the right to prohibit certain commercial uses of




to ensure that the provision fully comports with First Amendment
requirements, a court should adhere to the following guidelines
when deciding a case under'§ 43(c).
First, although the FTDA precludes a dilution action against
non-commercial use of a trademark or against fair use of a mark
"in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify
the registrant's competing goods or services, '' 4° it does not go far
enough to protect an alleged diluter's First Amendment rights. A
recent line of cases has recognized that, even in the commercial
speech area, First Amendment concerns require that a trademark
defendant be able to assert a parody defense.40 7 As the Seventh
Circuit has recently explained:
Manufacturers and merchants invest a great deal in
trademarks for the good will of their businesses. Obviously
they hope the public' at large identifies their trademarks.
When businesses seek the national spotlight, part of the
territory includes accepting a certain amount of ridicule.
The First Amendment, which protects individuals from laws
infringing free expression, allows such ridicule in the form
406. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)).
407. See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1227-28, 1231-32 (7th
Cir. 1993) (in footwear manufacturer's trademark infringement suit against local artist
who sold t-shirts with the name "Mike" over a "swoosh" design similar to plaintiff's
mark, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether defendant's intent was to
parody, and therefore amuse, rather than confuse); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld,
Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1489-91 (10th Cir. 1987) (owner of "Jordache" trademark failed to
prove either likelihood of confusion or dilution against a manufacturer of blue jeans for
larger women, which utilized the mark "Lardashe" and a smiling pig, because, due to "the
parody aspect of 'Lardashe,' it is not likely that public identification of 'Jordache' with
the plaintiff will be eroded"); The Black Dog Tavern Co., Inc. v. Hall, 823 F. Supp. 48,
57-58 (D. Mass. 1993) (restaurant owner, who sold t-shirts with name of restaurant "The
Black Dog" printed on them, failed to prove either trademark infringement or dilution
against seller of t-shirts bearing the words "The Dead Dog" or "The Black Hog," because
of defendant's parody intent); Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp.
440, 450-52 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (battery manufacturer failed to prove either infringement or
dilution of its "Energizer Bunny" mark by beer manufacturer's use of actor dressed in
bunny costume in beer commercial due to parody aspect of advertisement); cf. Cardtoons
v. Major League Baseball Players Assoc., 868 F. Supp. 1266, 1271-76 (N.D. Okla. 1994)
(recognizing parody defense in "mixed" commercial use case arising under Oklahoma's
"right of publicity" statute).
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of parody.4 8
Rep. Moorhead's addition of a "fair use for comparative adver-
tising" exception is therefore not sufficient to safeguard this parody
right because, like the Second Circuit in Deere, a court may well
conclude that the humorous alteration of a well-known mark in a
commercial advertisement does more than indicate the identity of
the market leader; it threatens to dilute the potency of the mark as
well.409 However, when so concluding in Deere, the Second Cir-
cuit overlooked the fact that a use can be "mixed," i.e. undertaken
for both commercial profit and for creative, entertainment purposes.
This latter, "parody" function of a mark's use must be taken into
account in both trademark infringement and dilution actions be-
cause the public's recognition of a mark's use as merely humorous
will tend to negate its propensity to either confuse or dilute.410 In
fact, as the Tenth Circuit has noted, such a "parody" use could well
act as a free form of advertising for the market leader, thereby
increasing the potency of its mark in the public's mind.4 1
Accordingly, in order to safeguard a defendant's First Amend-
ment commercial speech right, a court should interpret the Lanham
Act's new fair use provision to provide for a parody defense in a
dilution action.41 '2 However, this would not be an absolute defense.
The defendant's use of the mark as a parody should be one of the
factors a court weighs in determining whether or not the defen-
dant's use was likely to dilute the plaintiff's mark.413 By effecting
this change, a First Amendment safeguard would be built right into
the Act in much the same way that First Amendment concerns are
subsumed under the fair use provision of the federal copyright
statute.414
A plaintiff's rights would be protected under this scheme since
408. Nike, 6 F.3d at 1227.
409. See Deere & Co., 41 F.3d at 44-45.
410. See Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485, 1489-90.
411. See id. at 1490-91.
412. A court should also allow a parody defense in a traditional trademark infringe-
ment action. See, e.g., Eveready Battery Co., 765 F. Supp. at 450-452.
413. See, e.g., Black Dog Tavern, 823 F. Supp. at 57; Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1484-85;
Nike, 6 F.3d at 1228.
414. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); cf. Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1270.
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there are a number of legal principles serving to restrict a defen-
dant's First Amendment right. First, a court could properly give
greater First Amendment protection to a parody, which is being
sold for its own sake, than to one which is being used as a tool to
sell a distinct product. 15 Second, whether commercial or noncom-
mercial, there is no First Amendment protection for a use contain-
ing obscenity or "fighting words," i.e., words that go beyond the
pale of humor, satire or parody and constitute nothing but a bare
insult to the plaintiff.416 One commentator has argued that, under
these traditional First Amendment principles, the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders case and the Coca-Cola poster case were thus proba-
bly correctly decided. 17 Although the former involved a movie,
which is arguably a form of noncommercial speech, it was a porno-
graphic movie devoid of any social message.41 8 Similarly, although
one could characterize the Coca-Cola poster as a parody, it certain-
ly was not a noncommercial parody since it conveyed no social
message. While the defendant could have argued that it was a
commercial parody, which should have been accorded some First
Amendment protection, the plaintiff could have countered with the
argument that it was not a parody for two reasons. First, the poster
crossed the bounds of parody and entered the domain of "fighting
words." The poster acted as a direct insult to the integrity of the
plaintiffs product and its business. 419 Second, it copied too much
of the plaintiffs mark to constitute a protective parody. Recent
case law reveals that courts will only consider a junior use a legal-
ly protected parody if it copies just enough of the plaintiff's mark
to amuse and to make its point of comparison with the plaintiff.
420
415. See Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1273.
416. See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks As Speech: Constitutional Implications
of the Emerging Rationales For the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158,
202-06 (1982).
417. See id.
418. Denicola had some reservations about the Court's cavalier dismissal of the First
Amendment defense in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, but noted the lack of social mes-
sage or expression of ideas in the pornographic movie. See id. at 205-06.
419. See id. at 204-05.
420. See Eveready Battery Co. 765 F. Supp. at 451-52; Black Dog Tavern, 823 F.
Supp. at 57.
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If a defendant copies too much of a plaintiff's mark, it is either
bordering on being a confusing use or a grossly insulting one.421
In either case, the plaintiff's right to protect its mark against in-
fringing or diluting uses could well prevail over the defendant's
minimal First Amendment right.
E. Monopolization of Language Concerns
To a large extent, the same principles serving to safeguard a
defendant's First Amendment right in a dilution cause of action
would also act to prevent unnecessary monopolization of language
from occurring.4 22 Yet there remains one more "monopolization of
language" concern that needs to be addressed. At least one court
has suggested that the dilution doctrine is applicable to prevent the
use of a mark on promotional or collateral goods when the mark
is being used primarily for a functional, utilitarian purpose and not
as a source signifier.423 Callman actually approves of this extension
of the dilution doctrine. He therefore writes that "at least where
verbal and pictorialmarks are concerned, dilution protection should
not be denied on the ground that such a mark is functional. ' 4
24
Callman's reasoning is, however, flawed. If a mark is not be-
ing used as a mark, then it should not receive protection under
either an infringement or a dilution rationale. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to assess whether the promotional goods deci-
sions that have allowed a plaintiff to prevail on a traditional trade-
mark infringement ground, without actually proving a likelihood of
confusion, were correct.425 Suffice it to say that it would be wholly
improper to extend the dilution doctrine to the promotional goods
area.
421. See Denicola, supra note 416, at 357.
422. Furthermore, the FTDA's drafters could have provided an additional buffer
against undesirable monopolization of language had they restricted a federal dilution cause
of action to suits between competitors.
423. See Plasticolor Molded Prods. v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1343
(C.D. Cal. 1989), vacated, 767 F. Supp. 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
424. See CALLMAN, supra note 54, § 21.11, at 70.
425. See, e.g., Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Mfg., 510 F.2d 1004, 1010-12 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868, reh'g denied, 423
U.S. 991 (1975); Boston Athletic Assoc. v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 32-35 (lst Cir. 1989).
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Bi-Rite Enterprises v. Button Master42 6 illustrates this point. In
Bi-Rite, a number of musical groups and a distributor of buttons
bearing the likenesses and logos of these groups brought a trade-
mark infringement and dilution cause of action against a number
of companies that manufactured or sold "bootleg" buttons. 427 The
plaintiff distributor claimed to possess the exclusive licensing rights
to reproduce and sell several of the musicians' marks at issue.428
The court denied the plaintiffs' dilution claim because they had
failed to prove that the defendants' use had actually harmed the
plaintiffs' marks in any way. According to the court, a contrary
result was likely since the "defendants provide fans of the various
[p]erformers an opportunity to announce their allegiance to the
groups, thereby publicizing the popularity of the groups. 429
The Bi-Rite court's reasoning is correct. The dilution doctrine
simply does not fit the promotional goods area. While a plaintiff
may be able to prevail on a right of publicity theory, as it did in
Bi-Rite,430 or on a traditional trademark infringement action upon
proof of likelihood of confusion, it would pervert the dilution doc-
trine's purpose to extend it to this area. Consequently, refusing to
extend the scope of the dilution doctrine in this manner guards
against unnecessary monopolization effects.
CONCLUSION
The dilution doctrine has manifested many changes since
Schechter first proposed it some 68 years ago. Although the doc-
trine poses some First Amendment and "monopolization of lan-
guage" concerns, they are not insurmountable. The FTDA would
likely pass constitutional muster as long as courts adopt additional
First Amendment safeguards when interpreting it. Hopefully, its
enactment will encourage greater uniformity in the dilution case
law. More importantly, the new federal dilution provision should
426. 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
427. Id. at 1191-92.
428. Id. at 1191.
429. Id. at 1196.
430. See id. at 1198-1200.
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impose desirable limits on the dilution doctrine by creating a limit-
ed, federal cause of action for a narrow class of plaintiffs. Its
adoption could well motivate states to reform their own laws to
conform to the federal standard, thereby checking the doctrine's
current expansion. For all of these reasons, Congress was wise to
have passed a limited federal dilution provision.431
431. At least one critic suggested that the states nullify their dilution statutes either
by legislative repeal or judicial fiat. See Welkowitz, supra note 58, at 586-87. Given the
seriousness with which courts have treated the dilution doctrine, and the clout of INTA's
lobbying, this outcome was bound to be unrealistic. Adoption of a limited federal dilution
provision was a far better alternative.
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